OPINION:
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Although his overly provocative rhetoric is fairly condemned, former President Donald Trump is correct in his criticism of disproportionate U.S. investment in NATO. The United States can’t afford to prop up the alliance at historic spending levels.
Nonbinding investment pledges are insufficient compensation for NATO’s Article 5 assurance that an attack on one constitutes an attack against all.
Our next president would be wise to continue to press our allies to increase their investment and to do so in defense capabilities that are of value to the collective. Without provocative public rhetoric that undermines the alliance and risks encouraging Russian President Vladimir Putin, our next commander in chief should press for a process to expel NATO members that fail to meet the common pledge.
This would impose a reasonable cost for Article 5 protections. After all, NATO’s strength ultimately lies in the commitment of its members to shared ideals, not in the number of its members.
In the aftermath of World War II, it made sense for the U.S. to assume a larger portion of the collective defense burden to buy space and time for our allies’ economic recoveries.
NATO has since proved itself a worthwhile investment. The alliance was instrumental in winning the Cold War, and it is noteworthy that the only time Article 5 has been invoked was in response to the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the U.S.
The alliance continues to be critical for defending democratic nations, including the U.S., against unjust intrusions by autocratic ones. U.S. power alone is insufficient to defend our interests and those of our allies against an increasingly cohesive partnership between Russia, China, North Korea, Iran and their surrogates.
But a nation with a $34 trillion debt, a strong distaste for taxes, an ever-increasing dependence on entitlements and growing global security concerns is no longer in a position to subsidize the regional defense of its allies. Our national debt presents at least as great a threat to our security as our foreign adversaries.
We are spending more in interest on our debt each year than the entirety of our annual defense budget. Moreover, as the Congressional Budget Office recently reported, the projected debt service will reduce the economy by 3.2% in the next three decades, more than three times the estimated cost associated with climate change.
Our allies would also be wise to recognize that, in the collective interest of democratic states, the priority of U.S. defense investment must go to the Indo-Pacific region. An increasingly aggressive China, empowered by the world’s second-largest economy, presents a greater global threat to democracy and free trade than a resurgent Russia does regionally.
Mr. Trump’s demand for U.S. allies to increase their share of the common defense burden was not new. What was new was that his approach achieved more effective results more quickly than those of his predecessors.
Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine further accelerated defense investment in many European states. In 2023, Poland invested 4.12% of its gross domestic product in defense, exceeding even the U.S. (3.49%). Twenty-three of NATO’s 32 member states now meet the 2% pledge. Yet several of our allies continue to fall short. Croatia (1.81%), Portugal (1.55%), Italy (1.49%), Canada (1.37%), Belgium (1.30%), Luxembourg (1.29%), Slovenia (1.29%) and Spain (1.28%) are expected to miss the target again this year.
In all the public discourse concerning the importance of NATO defense investment, perhaps the most important point is lost. What exactly should the 2% procure?
For some members, it translates into little more than a domestic jobs program. A disproportionate amount of their defense budget pays for military personnel relative to the armaments, ordnance and technology those personnel need to fight effectively. Yet personnel are often the quickest military assets acquired in a defense emergency. Today’s sophisticated defense technologies have a much longer lead time.
Another important question is how the individual investments of states with widely differing economic capacities come together to form an efficient whole. The good news is that NATO has begun to address these issues, albeit in the slow bureaucratic manner that might be expected from an arrangement of 32 sovereign members.
The alliance has identified significant gaps in munitions, air defense, secure digital communications, long-range missiles and logistics areas. NATO is becoming aware that 2% is insufficient to restore Europe’s collective ability to confront Russia and has initiated discussion on raising the pledge.
In an important step further, NATO members are debating the merits of establishing binding defense capability targets for member investment. This will be hard domestic political work for each ally.
• Norm Cooling, a retired Marine Corps brigadier general, served in several U.S. European Command and NATO assignments in his 33 years of service. These included serving as executive assistant to NATO’s supreme allied commander, deputy commander of U.S. Marine Forces Europe and Africa and the deputy and acting J-3 director of plans and operations for the U.S. European Command.
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