Chinese spies are lurking in or around the offices of our elected leaders

OPINION:

Earlier this month, the FBI arrested Linda Sun, a naturalized U.S. citizen originally from China, who had served for a time as the deputy chief of staff to New York Governor Kathy Hochul. Ms. Sun’s husband, Chris Hu, who owned a seafood company as well as a wine store, was also arrested.

Ms. Sun was accused of acting as an unregistered agent of the Chinese government. According to the 65-page indictment, she allegedly influenced New York politicians’ public statements to conform to the talking points of the ruling Chinese Communist Party. She blocked Taiwanese government representatives from engaging with the governor’s office. Ms. Sun and her husband also allegedly engaged in money laundering for almost a decade.

The indictment did not state exactly when Ms. Sun allegedly began working for Beijing or how she was exposed. Still, it was the administration of former New York Democratic Gov. Andrew Cuomo who first hired her in 2012. Ms. Hochul promoted Ms. Sun to deputy chief of staff in 2021 but later fired her after discovering evidence of misconduct. She transferred to the state’s Department of Labor, where she presumably continued to act as an agent of the PRC until she was fired in March 2023.

Ms. Sun’s case, if true, is the very definition of a counterintelligence insider threat, which, unlike fine wine — as my CIA mentors used to say — does not get better with age. Ms. Sun’s consistent opposition to Taiwan should have been just one clue to potentially even more nefarious behavior. The government also alleges that Ms. Sun participated in a protest in downtown Manhattan against a U.S. visit by the president of Taiwan and helped Chinese officials gain access to New York City government leaders during the pandemic.

Ms. Sun and her husband, who have denied the charges, own a $3.5 million home in Long Island, a $2.1 million condo in Honolulu and a 2024 Ferrari. Yet their personal and business tax returns reportedly reflected little income earned. Ms. Sun also traveled to Beijing for three weeks in September and October 2019.

This would not be the first highly publicized case of China targeting U.S. politicians: In 2015, the FBI informed Rep. Eric Swalwell, a California Democrat, that Christine Fang, a Chinese national whom he first met in 2012, was a suspected spy. Ms. Fang fled to China amidst the ensuing FBI investigation.

The case points up another truism of the intelligence business: Information does not have to be classified to be of great value to our enemies.

Ms. Fang and Ms. Sun, just by their access to politicians and their staffs, would have had the opportunity to map out social networks and professional contacts, which Chinese intelligence could later exploit. And of course there were regular opportunities to influence policy decisions in China’s favor.

Ms. Fang cut a wide swath. She allegedly engaged in romantic relationships with at least two Midwestern mayors; performed volunteer work for California Democratic congressman Ro Khanna; and raised funds for both Mr. Swalwell and former Democratic Rep. Tulsi Gabbard of Hawaii.

Following Ms. Fang’s departure for China, the FBI reportedly provided additional defensive counterintelligence briefings to the White House and some members of Congress.

Clearly, more needs to be done to protect ourselves. If there’s one thing I learned at the CIA, it’s that counterintelligence operations are usually far worse and far-ranging than what is initially uncovered. It’s certainly quite possible there are other Chinese spies lurking in or around the offices of our elected leaders.

But it’s never too late to act.

China is flooding the zone in the U.S. with a wide spectrum of espionage operations, of which the Fang and Sun cases are just two publicly exposed examples. For example, China has employed its “Thousand Talents” program to target and recruit sources in the U.S. scientific community. Chinese spies are ruthlessly stealing our intellectual property and hacking into our most critical infrastructure.

If there’s one silver lining here, it’s the strong bipartisan consensus on the necessity of identifying and deterring China’s multifarious threats.

Democrats and Republicans should press the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to implement a more comprehensive defensive counterintelligence program to support federal, state, and local elected officials. If proven, the case against Ms. Sun should serve as a case study and admonition to all elected representatives and their staffs.

Let’s remember Ms. Hochul, like Mr. Swalwell, Mr. Khanna and Ms. Gabbard, was a victim of Chinese espionage. However, she and her office must be fully transparent about the extent to which they were subjected to Chinese spycraft, including a complete damage assessment. This is how we strengthen our nation’s defenses against the Chinese leadership’s unacceptable onslaught against our democracy.

• Daniel N. Hoffman is a retired clandestine services officer and former chief of station with the Central Intelligence Agency.