SEOUL, South Korea — Two of the North Korean regime’s most senior figures are less than impressed with South Korea’s newly activated Strategic Command, calling it a command with a notable lack of powerful assets.
On Armed Forces Day on Oct 1, South Korea rolled out a massive short-range missile, tipped with an eight-ton conventional warhead. On the same day, it officially opened a new Strategic Command to oversee the military’s use of its most powerful weapons and coordinate policy with the United States.
Kim Yo-jong, the influential sister of regime leader Kim Jong-un, noted in state media that the new command “does not possess one single strategic weapon.”
“If they had a certain amount of common sense, who could speak about the ’end of regime’ while boasting a uselessly huge weapon?” Ms. Kim asked in her editorial, carried by the Korea Central News Agency.
In his Armed Forces Day speech, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol had repeated an oft-delivered warning: That if North Korea ever used a nuclear weapon, it would result in the end of the Kim regime.
Separately, but in a similar vein, Kim Jong-un during a visit to a special operations unit dubbed South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol “abnormal,” noting that North Korea, unlike the South, has developed and stockpiled its own arsenal of nuclear bombs.
“The puppet Yoon bragged about overwhelming counteraction of military muscle at the doorstep of the state possessed of nuclear weapons,” Mr. Kim said, calling it, “a great irony.”
An accompanying image from state media showed troops in digital camouflage in a wooded area taking notes as Mr. Kim – seated on an office chair at a plush-looking desk, smoking a cigarette – addressed them.
The term “strategic weapons” usually refers to arms capable of unleashing mass destruction: nuclear devices, heavy bomber fleets, and chemical and biological weapons.
North Korea lacks a powerful air force, but is otherwise bristling with weapons of mass destruction, or WMD.
It has successfully tested six nuclear devices, and is constantly upgrading its armory of rocket and missile delivery systems. In 2017, maverick ruling-clan member Kim Jong-nam was assassinated in Kuala Lumpur by North Korean proxies wielding a VX nerve agent.
South Korea, a key U.S. ally in East Asia, operates under the aegis of nuclear-armed America’s “extended deterrence,” but Seoul itself – at least officially – possesses no home-grown WMD.
The Hyunmoo-3 short-range ballistic missile and the Strategic Command, according to Asan Institute military specialist Yang Uk, are “strategic” in the sense that they aim, not at the massed civilian population, but at strategic targets.
Those targets are the ruling Kime family, related elites and North Korea’s nuclear command and control systems. The Hyunmoo’s massive explosive power is designed to obliterate targets sheltering deep underground.
The North Korea gibes may be fueling some blowback in Seoul, however. North Korea’s constant upgrading of its WMDs, combined with jitters over whether a second Donald Trump administration would be willing to risk American cities to shield South Korean cities, is generating an urgent debate here over whether South Korea should develop its own nuclear deterrent, a move that is broadly supported in public opinion polls.
“Naive Korean people may insist we have to have our own nuclear weapons,… and even [some] parliamentary members insist we should have our own capabilities,” said Jee Hong-ki, a retired South Korean colonel. “That is a natural reaction, but it is very political.”
A dedicated forum has been set up in the National Assembly to discuss “nuclear latency”: the acquisition of assets and skills that would enable South Korea to swiftly weaponize its existing nuclear power sector, if and when needed.
The nascent Strategic Command may itself be a step on the journey. It combines doctrinal thinkers, operational planners, command and control suites and intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities under a unified structure. As such, it could seamlessly establish command over, and control, atomic arms should the political leadership decide to move ahead.
“Great move,” a veteran and former U.S. Forces Korea officer wrote of the command on social media. “A suitable command and sustainment structure for a rapid nuclearization program if need be – or possibly already on the way.”
“It makes sense,” said Dan Pinkston, a Seoul-based international relations expert with Troy University.
He added that if prosperous, high-tech South Korea did develop domestic nuclear arms, it could swiftly outpace North Korea.
“As far as developing and deploying military capabilities, South Korea is at a much greater advantage in terms of capacity,” he said. “From telecommunications to roads, to science and technology, to human resources.”
But there are serious risks as well.
It is far from clear Washington would approve such a blow to the global non-proliferation regime, and Seoul could face diplomatic condemnation, and possibly sanctions, from the international community.
An even greater risk is that North Korea — seeing its rival acquiring the capabilities that grant Pyongyang its only significant national advantage over Seoul — might take preemptive action.
“Lots of South Koreans are saying ‘Let’s nuke up and establish deterrence,’ but the North Koreans could do what the Israelis did to Iraq and Syria,” said Mr. Pinkston, referring to Israeli airstrikes on those nations’ nuclear facilities.
“Even if that was a limited strike, what [could South Korea] do?” he wondered. “Launch a conventional counter-strike? Go to war?”
• Andrew Salmon can be reached at asalmon@washingtontimes.com.
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