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The U.S. Government Accountability Office says federal nuclear regulators have consistently ignored its recommendations for preventing the detonation of a “dirty bomb” — a weapon that combines radioactive material with conventional explosives like dynamite or TNT — and now are appealing for lawmakers to step in.
In a report released last week, the congressional watchdog organization appealed directly to Congress to force the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to implement reforms the GAO says have been ignored.
The GAO was asked to review federal government efforts to protect the country against dirty bombs. The agency examined the policies of the National Nuclear Security Administration, the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction office at the Department of Homeland Security and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. While some agencies have been responsive to the auditors’ findings, the NRC has not.
“In terrorists’ hands, even small amounts of radioactive material could be used to make a dirty bomb,” the new GAO report reads in part. “Over the past decade, we’ve made 18 recommendations to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that would strengthen its security requirements for these materials. But more than half of those recommendations haven’t been implemented.”
Radioactive materials are commonly used for medical, industrial and research purposes. But in the hands of terrorists, even a small amount of material could be used to make a dirty bomb. Along with the threat to human life, an explosion would likely result in heavy economic harm, property damage and public panic, the GAO said.
“It really takes just one bad actor with access to a source to wreak havoc,” Allison Bawden, director of Natural Resources and the Environment at the GAO, said last Thursday in a podcast hosted by the agency. “Over the last 10 years, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission reported over 4,000 nuclear materials events, which include instances of lost or stolen radioactive materials, that could be misused.”
The NRC issues licenses for radioactive materials and provides security requirements that must be followed. The regulations are less stringent for lesser quantities, known as Category 3 and below, than for larger quantities — Category 1 or 2. However, the GAO contends the categories represent a distinction without a difference.
A radioactive dirty bomb could cause billions of dollars in “socioeconomic consequences” as entire areas could be declared contaminated, to say nothing of damages resulting from a public panic, the GAO said.
“We found that these consequences differ very little whether the radiological source that was used is large, a Category 1 or 2 source, or a smaller Category 3 source,” Ms. Bawden said.
She said the NNSA and DHS consider the financial and economic impact on a community from a dirty bomb. At the same time, the NRC takes a different approach to developing its regulatory framework.
“The NRC does not include socioeconomic consequences when it calculates regulatory costs and benefits, and those cost-benefit analyses are used to, for example, set security requirements,” Ms. Bawden said. “The NRC is assessing risk on how many people will die. The other agencies are looking at that and then also the economic and social impacts.”
On Thursday, an NRC spokesman said the agency appreciated the GAO’s work on the subject of radioactive sources security and noted that it has made similar recommendations in the past.
“As before, the NRC continues to consider prompt fatalities and deterministic health effects from radiation as the primary consequences of concern for assessing the risk of a so-called ‘dirty bomb,’” the NRC said in a statement to The Washington Times. “The current regulatory requirements provide for the safe and secure use of radioactive materials regardless of their category.”
In March 2022, the NRC was notified that the GAO conducted an undercover investigation into the security of nuclear materials. They were able to buy several quantities of Category 3 material using shell companies and fraudulent licenses. If they tried to purchase Category 1 or 2 material, the regulators would have been required to verify their license.
“We could have bought more Category 3 quantities of materials to aggregate them to a Category 2 quantity,” Ms. Bawden said. “Category 3 licenses do not need to be independently verified.”
The GAO said the other agencies agreed to implement most of their recommendations to reduce the risk of a dirty bomb attack. However, the NRC has not enacted 11 out of 18 GAO suggestions made between 2012-2021, officials said.
The GAO watchdogs want Congress to direct the NRC to incorporate potential economic consequences into its decision-making and regulatory process and require that licenses for radioactive materials be tracked with stronger verification measures.
“NRC neither agreed nor disagreed with GAO’s report. GAO maintains that actions are needed,” the report said.
• Mike Glenn can be reached at mglenn@washingtontimes.com.
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