ANALYSIS:
SEOUL, South Korea — Despite the amity they display, the world’s two leading anti-Western leaders — Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin — are far from aligned when it comes to war-making.
Celebrating the 75th anniversary of bilateral diplomatic relations, Mr. Xi feted Mr. Putin at last week’s two-day summit, while talking up “strategic cooperation.”
Yet the partners’ conflict approaches do not just differ from those of the United States — they diverge from each other.
Washington has engaged in multiple expeditionary wars to support allies and overthrow regimes. None of its conflicts for over a century, however, has aimed at actual territorial conquest.
Conversely, China’s and Russia’s wars share old-fashioned aims.
Under Mr. Putin and Mr. Xi, their two countries have deployed forces around their national peripheries to maintain, restore or expand their states’ territories, people and resources in perpetuity.
Bar Moscow’s mission in Syria to shore up President Bashir Assad, all the wars fought by Mr. Putin, who took power in 1999, have shared these aims.
The second Chechen war forcefully maintained that republic within the Russian Federation. Moscow’s Georgia intervention ended with two chunks of Georgian territory in Russian hands.
The Kremlin’s revanchist seizure of Crimea, intervention in Donbas and invasion of Ukraine are all grabs of land that are absorbed into Russia.
Under Mr. Xi, who entered office in 2013, Chinese forces have seized ground across the South China Sea, terraforming uninhabited reefs and islets into dominant land-sea bases. Coast guards and centrally directed fishing fleets deny the area and its marine resources to Southeast Asian neighbors.
Beijing is also inching toward India in the high Himalayas and toward Taiwan in the Taiwan Strait. Similar tactics have been resisted by Tokyo around the Japanese-administered Diaoyu/Senkaku islands.
However, Mr. Xi’s and Mr. Putin’s strategies differ radically. Russian warfare is deadly and destructive; Chinese warfare, not always non-lethal, is non-kinetic.
“Xi is a far subtler leader than Putin: Think of him as a sophisticated businessman who gets you to sign a contract that will ensure your demise,” said Geoffrey Cain, author of “The Perfect Police State.” “Putin is the gangster who doesn’t care if you sign, and will shoot you in the back of the head.”
Though both capitals confront the West, Beijing, despite its diplomatic and economic support, may be uncomfortable with Moscow’s sledgehammer aggression.
The 2022 term “unlimited partnership” has largely disappeared from Chinese state media. Today, Li Ziguo, who directs the Department for European-Central Asian Studies at China’s Institute of International Studies, told Xinhua News: “China and Russia have been adhering to the principles of non-alliance, non-confrontation and not targeting any third party.”
That outlook may explain why Mr. Xi has not armed Mr. Putin with the high-tech weapons China wields, forcing Russia into an undignified position: Turning to low-tier players Iran and North Korea.
It may also evidence a hidden political agenda, experts say: making Moscow Beijing’s subordinate.
Putin’s wars, Xi’s wars
The carnage and destruction unleashed upon Ukraine mirrors that of the first conflict Mr. Putin oversaw as president, the second Chechen War. But unlike prior victories, his Ukraine gamble has seen humiliations and defeats.
The initial 2022 assault upon Ukraine amid the spring wet season saw Russian armor advancing in road columns — dispositions easily ambushed. Subsequently, Russian forces lost major ground in surprise Ukrainian counterattacks in the east and the south. Moscow’s Black Sea fleet was decimated by drones and missiles.
Since Kyiv’s summer 2023 offensive broke its teeth on Russian defenses, Moscow’s forces have turned the tide and regained momentum.
In the Donbas, they are grinding inexorably forward, seizing ruined town after ruined town. On May 10, they opened a new front that potentially threatens Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second city, with long-range fire or siege — a move that is stretching Kyiv’s reserves.
It is slogging, firepower-centric warfare, and experts recognize a pattern. In multiple conflicts — Napoleon’s invasion, World War II, Chechnya — Russia started weak, and ended strong.
“After well-known miscalculations and blunders, the overall strategy is quite clear,” said Gastone Breccia, a military historian at the University of Pavia. “Conduct a series of battles of attrition, wearing down Ukraine’s resources and Western will to help Ukrainians fight on.”
Mr. Xi’s tactics are subtler.
Chinese forces have not fired a shot since 1988. Instead, Beijing uses grey-zone tactics of incremental probes and advances, swift de-escalation, cognitive warfare, cyber ops and economic leverage: “fighting without fighting.”
‘”Subtle and insubstantial, the expert leaves no trace: Divinely mysterious he is inaudible, thus he is the master of his enemy’s fate,’” said Mr. Breccia. “Xi seems risk-averse as he is playing by the rules of Chinese warfare: Win by other means, avoid open battle, conquer your objective intact.”
With no clear line between combat and non-combat, and with operations undertaken by both civilians and servicemen, Chinese tactics are hard to confront said Michael Cunningham, a China specialist with Heritage Foundation. “It is warfare that is not bounded in any particular realm; it could be multiple realms.”
These tactics present challenges for traditionally postured Western militaries. Meanwhile, Moscow’s warriors — unlike the lightly armed insurgents Western troops battled in the war on terror — demand deterrence via mass and sustainability.
“There’s intersection of [grey-zone tactics] with traditional security concerns,” Peter Dean, a foreign policy and defense specialist at Sydney University told the recent Asan Plenum, a security conference in Seoul. “Old concepts are coming back to the fore reinforced by Ukraine: National resilience is really key.”
Xi vs. Putin?
One aspect of Beijing policymaking is uncomfortable for China hawks in the West.
Chinese trade with Russia has risen almost three-fold in a decade. Beijing faces criticism for supplying Moscow with dual-use components, but has not offered actual arms even as Western nations supply Kyiv with a vast armory.
Some believe Xi cannot arm Russia for fear his trade-reliant economy will be hammered by Western sanctions. Others reckon Xi is playing a secret double game that nods to older China-Soviet rivalries.
China seeks to “turn Russia into a proxy for Chinese interests,” said Mr. Cain, policy director at NGO the Tech Integrity Project. The tactic is “making the Russian economy technologically reliant upon China, which is willing to offer it in bulk, and at great discounts.”
“Keep Russia at bay while helping her,” added Mr. Breccia. “Perfect Chinese art of war!”
• Andrew Salmon can be reached at asalmon@washingtontimes.com.
Please read our comment policy before commenting.