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SEOUL, South Korea — North Korea on Tuesday test-fired a range of what it said were submarine-capable cruise missiles into the Yellow Sea.
Although another Pyongyang weapons test isn’t exactly news these days, the tests mark the third set of cruise missile launches within seven days for the regime of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. Submarine-launched cruise missiles reported over the weekend had an estimated range of 600 to 900 miles, South Korean analysts said. Adding the submarine-launched missiles to the land-based nuclear deterrent offers North Korea a diversified, survivable strike capability, experts say.
Although the pattern is familiar, North Korea’s relentless arms development is calling into question the U.S.-led “maximum pressure” approach to restrain Mr. Kim. That approach, including diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, undercover “left-of-launch” tactics, drills by conventional forces and nuclear-based “extended deterrence” for South Korea, has so far failed to halt the North’s programs.
Two dynamics are in play.
On the one hand, North Korea’s dictatorial system, harsh rhetoric and weapons development programs alarm capitals across the region and around the world. On the other, the threat of an actual attack has largely been contained since the Korean War armistice was signed in 1953, putting it on the priority back burner behind bloodier crises.
Now, however, a growing number of North Korea watchers say inaction is not an option, though what to do remains as hard to determine as ever.
Unstoppable Mr. Kim
North Korea is an economic black hole in the midst of Northeast Asia’s high-tech manufacturing superpowers: China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.
Economic backwardness has not prevented the world’s 55th-largest country by population from fielding the world’s fourth-largest standing army or blocking the development of high-tech arms and weapons of mass destruction.
Pyongyang detonated its first nuclear device in 2006. It tested an ICBM capable of reaching the U.S. in 2017. Any hopes that the state might be content with those capabilities are long dashed. North Korea subsequently detonated five more nuclear warheads and a plethora of missile delivery systems.
Its most recent acquisition road map was laid out at a landmark Workers’ Party Congress in January 2021. The congress made public a formidable list of assets to be developed.
Two weapons on the list – “hypersonic gliding flight warheads” and solid-fuel ballistic missiles — have been successfully tested, according to North Korean state media and overseas analyses, respectively.
An “underwater-launch nuclear strategic weapon,” which may refer to an unmanned nuclear torpedo, has been tested several times this year. A “military reconnaissance satellite” was successfully launched in November.
Two assets on the 2021 list, “super-sized nuclear warheads” and tactical nuclear weapons, have not yet seen the light. The status of a “long-range reconnaissance drone” is also unknown, as is a “nuclear-powered submarine.”
Experience suggests it would be unwise to bet against North Korea’s achievement of its goals. Since 2022, the seismic shocks dealt to the international system by the Ukraine war, which is drawing North Korea and Moscow closer, add further grounds for pessimism.
“North Korea has a whole new continent — meaning new, strengthened ties with Moscow and maintenance of existing ties with Beijing,” said Moon Chung-in, an academic who advised all three South Korean administrations that have engaged with North Korea. “It is no longer totally isolated. It has new backers and a new lifeline.”
Daniel Pinkston, an international relations professor at Troy University, said force is no longer an option for disarming North Korea’s military machine.
“As long as the North Korean leadership can be deterred, using force to topple the regime is a cure that would be worse than the disease,” said Mr. Pinkston. “It would unleash forces we want to prevent.”
The South Korean-U.S. combined posture has helped prevent another Korean war, but Pyongyang’s recent moves suggest ignoring the problem is no longer feasible.
“North Korea weapons development matters because it proliferates,” said Chun In-bum, a retired South Korean general. “They’re like a drug manufacturer.”
North Korea has supplied arms to regimes in Cuba, Syria and Yemen. More recent U.S. intelligence reports say Mr. Kim is sending munitions and missiles to Russia to rearm its forces in Ukraine.
‘Errorgeddon’
Another factor arguing against inaction is the potential for unintentional conflict, the “Errorgeddon” scenario.
“The problem on the Korean Peninsula is not war by plan, but accidental clashes leading to full-blown escalation,” Mr. Moon said.
With Pyongyang rejecting overtures for talks from Seoul and Washington, an unintended skirmish on the Demilitarized Zone or in the Yellow Sea could spiral swiftly upward to nuclear catastrophe.
Some suggest the U.S. and its regional allies should focus not on North Korean denuclearization – a goal virtually all experts agree is unacceptable to Pyongyang – but on arms reduction.
“The whole point is, how to be pragmatic and realistic,” Mr. Moon said. “A lot of people argue that if we engage in arms control talks, that is tantamount to recognizing North Korea as a nuclear weapons state. But that is a reality.”
This approach may prove unpalatable in Seoul and Washington.
“Is it viable politically?” asked Choi Jong-kun, a former deputy foreign minister under the Moon Jae-in administration, which engaged closely with North Korea. “Arms control talks should be reciprocal. … They naturally involve bilateral reductions of something.”
Another factor makes de-arming North Korea problematic. Rising international risks, combined with the ongoing expansion of Pyongyang’s armory, make it increasingly valuable.
“The so-called ‘pricing’ of North Korea’s nuclear capacity – production facilities, nuclear materials, assets – was cheapest at the time of the [2019] Hanoi summit,” said Mr. Choi, now an academic at Seoul’s Yonsei University. “But the value North Korea has attached to it has increased. … If we have another chance at the negotiation table, their pricing of what they have will be very, very expensive.”
Others are even more downbeat. Mr. Pinkston reckons negotiating tactics are irrelevant given North Korea’s political DNA.
“In terms of entering long-term transactions, nobody can believe a dictator. A dictator cannot make a credible commitment,” he said.
Pyongyang’s current rejection of diplomacy also argues against the prospect of new talks.
“North Korea is the weakest actor in the region. … They should be the first in line for restraint,” Mr. Pinkston said. “If they are interested, they have the contacts and phone numbers to get started.”
• Andrew Salmon can be reached at asalmon@washingtontimes.com.
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