OPINION:
On a chilly Jerusalem evening in 2016, Western officials from the United States, the European Union and nongovernmental organizations, alongside Palestinian intellectuals, gathered in the American Colony Hotel for what one senior European diplomat called “political blasphemy”: a presentation by international peacemaker Padraig O’Malley of his book “The Two-State Delusion.”
The reactions bifurcated down a clear line: The Palestinians in the audience mocked the thesis, saying the author is stating the obvious. Palestine is one state, and of course, the two-state solution is a Western delusion that has nothing to do with them, they said. On the other hand, the Europeans and other Westerners in the room were up in arms: “What about us?” they scolded the author. “We invested years of our career in developing this template.”
This underscores a dichotomy about the two-state solution. It is sacrosanct in Western policy circles but mocked by many in the Middle East.
The two-state solution is anchored in “structured ambiguity.”
For Israelis as well as for Western policymakers, the two-state solution is about a “solution”: ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This includes an “end of claims” statement from a Palestinian body, such as the Palestinian Authority. Moreover, for Israelis and Westerners, the Palestinian territories are demilitarized, with Israel controlling the airspace and entry points. In addition, in all variations of the two-state solution, dating back to the Geneva Initiative, there remain some Israeli military presence and settlement blocks. This is the template that Israelis have considered and still overwhelmingly reject.
But for Palestinians, the two-state solution is about something completely different. It is about a state. The new Palestine will be the body managing the ongoing conflict with Israel. This is certainly not about the “end of claims” — an absurd demand so early in the conflict, where the generation that was “ethnically cleansed” from Tel Aviv, according to the Palestinian narrative, is still alive and expects to return.
Nor is it about a state-minus, as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu once called it. Palestine would be a state with an army, control of its airspace and full sovereignty, a rightful “state amongst the nations.’’ This is the template that the Palestinians have considered and still overwhelmingly reject.
And so, the two-state solution, deemed infeasible, was reduced to a talking point. For example, when President Biden spoke upon his arrival in Israel in 2022, his speech included affirming his support for the two-state solution, but he stopped and added before that line “even though I know it’s not in the near term.”
Indeed, “one day,” in centuries to come, a two-state solution can be a relevant framework based on circumstances that will exist at that time and are impossible to predict today: in Jordan, Syria, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.
This is especially true since we already had a “two-state solution” in 1920: a Jewish state in the making in Palestine, grounded in international law, living side by side next to a pro-Zionist Arab kingdom in Syria. This utopic Middle East ended when France invaded Syria, obliterated the Arab Kingdom and forced Arabs in the region to adopt a new Western-imposed identity: Palestinians.
While back in 1920, there was a horizon toward an organic two-state solution supported by Jews and Arabs alike, the 2023 version is of an artificial two-state solution is imposed by the West and rejected by Jews and Arabs alike. Indeed, the two-state solution can be viewed as an expression of contemporary Western colonialism.
Yet in a stunning response to the Oct. 7 atrocities, the United States not only awoke the two-state solution but also reportedly plans to unilaterally recognize the state of “Palestine.”
For Palestinians, while there is outright rejection of the two-state solution (accepting a Jewish state on what they view as Palestinian land), there is broad support for unilateral recognition of a state of Palestine.
For years, the defining intra-Palestinian debate has been: Is this objective best achieved diplomatically — a position championed by Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, or through the “armed struggle” — a position championed by terrorists such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad?
The U.S. put an end to this debate: It was not 30 years of negotiations by Mr. Abbas, but one day of murder and rape by Hamas, that got the United States to reward the long-sought state of Palestine.
This dramatic U.S. shift has dangerous reciprocation to the broader Middle East and can even destabilize Europe, where the events around Oct. 7 are closely watched as terrorists in Europe have the capability and now the incentive to perpetrate similar actions.
U.S. recognition of Palestine could also give a backwind to the nascent European Muslim nationalist movement (the “two-state solution in Europe”), as well as to separatists such as the Catalonians in Spain.
There is “a time for war and a time for peace.” Imposing an outdated template in a time of war does not promote peace; it perpetuates war and instability.
• Gol Kalev is the author of “Judaism 3.0: Judaism Transformation to Zionism” and chair of the Judaism 3.0 Think Tank. He analyzes long-term geopolitical shifts at EuropeAndJerusalem.com. He is also a columnist at The Jerusalem Post and writes for other publications.
Please read our comment policy before commenting.