OPINION:
While much has changed in the Middle East since President-elect Donald Trump was in office, the conflict in Syria has been frozen and forgotten in his absence.
The U.S. presence in the country, which began in 2014 with the mission to defeat the Islamic State group, remains to this day after the territorial defeat of the terrorist group, albeit with a limited deployment after a partial October 2019 withdrawal that Mr. Trump ordered.
While many Americans have forgotten Syria, it seems it’s still fresh on the mind of the president-elect, who wants to complete the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the country. But Mr. Trump also wants to protect Israel and curb Iranian expansion, which could create a dilemma if a potential withdrawal is botched, as was the exit of U.S. forces from Afghanistan under President Biden. Can Mr. Trump fulfill his campaign promise of bringing U.S. troops home without endangering U.S. allies?
America’s Syrian adventure began in 2014, when the U.S. formed a partnership with the YPG, a local Kurdish militia, to create the Syrian Democratic Forces, or SDF, to combat IS. The decision to collaborate with the YPG was largely because of the refusal of other Syrian armed groups to stop fighting against Iran-backed Shiite militias.
The YPG was the only group not engaged in hostilities against Iran. It was willing to work with the U.S. to fight IS, thus providing then-President Barack Obama an opportunity to protect a hallmark policy of his administration — the Iran nuclear deal.
This move, however, would have big long-term geopolitical trade-offs. Regional powerhouse and NATO ally Turkey strongly opposed this partnership since the YPG is the Syrian branch of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, which is classified as a foreign terrorist organization by the U.S., NATO and Turkey.
Since 2020, the situation in Syria has remained largely unchanged. The American military presence in the eastern part of the country has not varied in size or scope. After the territorial defeat of IS, many experts have argued that the mission has progressed without any clear objective. Iran benefited from the small presence of U.S. troops in Syria by using them as targets in tit-for-tat retaliation.
As Washington looked the other way, Iran-backed Shiite militias have strengthened their grip on Syria. Iran has consolidated its influence by building a land bridge from Tehran to Beirut to provide support to its regional proxies that threaten Israel.
Iran has strategically positioned itself against U.S. forces. The Euphrates River acts as a dividing line with Iran west of the river, while U.S. forces are on the eastern side. The U.S. relies on a single logistic line, which runs from northern Iraq into northeastern Syria and then southward to their presence in the region. In contrast, Iran has multiple logistic lines operating within Syria and Iraq. Iran is poised to fill any power vacuum that may arise from a potential botched American withdrawal. If Iran’s strategy is successful, the border region between Iraq and Syria could come under the control of Iran-backed militias.
The wars in Gaza and Lebanon will be a new geopolitical dynamic for Mr. Trump to consider when deciding to withdraw from Syria. As Mr. Biden’s withdrawal from Afghanistan has shown, a disorganized pullback could result in serious harm to U.S. allies and interests.
One major U.S. interest that must be considered when withdrawing from Syria will be how to bring back U.S. troops without harming Israel’s national security. Mr. Trump could scrap plans for a withdrawal, but that would leave U.S. troops vulnerable to attack. The other option would be to work with the Turks in a handover of territory and duties like the continuing fight against IS. While there is no love lost between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, one of his fiercest critics, northeastern Syria is an area where the security interests of the nations may align.
Ankara has long been uncomfortable with the proliferation of Shiite militias across Turkey’s southern Iraq and Syrian borders. If the Trump administration is to return to a maximum pressure policy against Iran, it should be implemented with an understanding of keeping tensions manageable. The Turks can play an important role in implementing this strategy as they have displayed the capability and decisiveness to eliminate Iranian proxies when provoked, and their presence serves as a deterrent, denying area and access to forces loyal to Tehran and Syrian President Bashar Assad.
Reaching an agreement with Turkey would serve many bilateral interests. First, it would consolidate the Turkish and American areas of influence in Syria, keeping Iran out. The expanded area would pave the way for refugees to return to their home country in the future, creating an opportunity to bring in the European Union as part of a rebuilding project. American weapons could be secured rather than fall into enemy hands as was the case in the Afghanistan withdrawal.
Finally, the YPG would move into areas of Russian and Iranian influence, taking a flash-point issue off the Turkish-American agenda and placing the problem in Russia and Iran’s lap.
While Mr. Trump’s inauguration is still weeks away, an efficient withdrawal from Syria could be one of the low-hanging foreign policy fruits that could be effectively accomplished in the first year. With proper coordination, Mr. Trump would fulfill a campaign promise, safeguard Israel’s national security, win over a disgruntled NATO ally in Turkey and have U.S. troops home before Easter.
• Omer Ozkizilcik is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council. Yusuf Erim is the editor at large of the Turkish public broadcaster TRT World.
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