France is not a reliable partner in the Middle East

OPINION:

Francois Bayreau, leader of the French centrist party Mouvement democrate, took over as prime minister from the ousted Michel Barnier on Dec. 13. Mr. Bayreau, an ally of President Emmanuel Macron, succeeded Mr. Barnier when the former’s government collapsed after only 90 days in office in a historic no-confidence vote put forward by the left-wing New Popular Front alliance and the right-wing National Rally.

In taking on the job of trying to restore stability to French politics, cobble together a government and agree on a way out of France’s budget crisis, Mr. Bayreau conceded that the odds were against him, saying, “I know that the risks of difficulties are much greater than the chances of success.”

While France attempts to insert itself into the power realignment in its former colonies Lebanon and Syria, the incoming U.S. administration should be cautious about involving Mr. Macron or France in restoring some semblance of order to the Middle East. Paris has long resented American clout in the Middle East and in the world, and it ceased being Israel’s ally since the 1960s.

France’s heyday in the region has long since passed. It is trying to restore its power by attaching itself to Washington in the critical period of instability in the eastern Mediterranean that involves Turkey, Russia, Iran, Qatar, Israel and a slew of Islamist and Kurdish militias jockeying for power.

Unfortunately for Mr. Macron, his odds of a successful presidency are also in free fall. He cannot continue as president past 2027 due to term limits, and the dissatisfaction of the voters and the weakness of the economy may result in his being pressed to resign before then, a political humiliation that he has thus far refused.

Like politicians before him, with things back home not going well, Mr. Macron has been casting about for opportunities to burnish his image, his place in history and his country’s perceived power on the international scene.

To understand French interests in the Middle East, it is important to remember that France has maintained a strategic position in the eastern Mediterranean since the 19th century. Until World War II, it controlled Lebanon through the Christian Maronite community and Syria through the Alawite sect headed by Bashar Assad’s grandfather Ali al-Wahsh. Numerous Arab and Druze revolts against French rule were violently put down.

Coming back to the present conflicts, the Iranian proxy Hezbollah began bombing northern Israel the day after Hamas attacked over the Gaza border on Oct. 7, 2023, killing 1,200 men, women and children and taking 254 hostages, including 12 U.S. citizens. Hezbollah’s shelling displaced some 60,000 Israelis from their homes. The Israelis finally began fighting back in earnest in September with a decapitation strike against Hezbollah field commanders followed by the killing of its secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah.

On Nov. 26, Mr. Macron shared the stage with President Biden and announced a deal to cease hostilities in Lebanon. The deal included a role for France to work with the U.S. to “ensure this arrangement is fully implemented and enforced.”

A look at the behind-the-scenes arm-twisting that led to France’s rather high-level involvement is revealing. Mr. Macron and his government resorted to a bait-and-switch tactic using the arrest warrants issued in November for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant on charges of war crimes in the Gaza Strip by the International Criminal Court, or ICC.

These warrants obligate the 123 ICC member states to detain Mr. Netanyahu and Mr. Gallant if they enter their territory. In response, the U.S. passed the Illegitimate Court Counteraction Act, sponsored by Rep. Chip Roy, Texas Republican. European reactions were uneven. Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands and Spain declared that they would enforce the warrants, while Hungary challenged the warrant and France, Germany and Italy remained vague about the issue.

Mr. Barnier and National Assembly President Yael Braun-Pivet promised that Paris would rigorously apply the arrest warrants if Mr. Netanyahu set foot on French soil. It is now evident, however, that this stance was simply a form of pressure on Israel to allow France to mediate ceasefire negotiations with Lebanon. The deal was struck in a phone conversation between Mr. Netanyahu and Mr. Macron, after which France’s rhetoric on the ICC warrant dramatically changed.

Instead of unwaveringly committing to international law, Mr. Macron said that Mr. Netanyahu may enjoy immunity as a serving Cabinet minister. Before his conversation with Mr. Macron, Mr. Netanyahu had told U.S. officials that he was unwilling to allow France any role in overseeing the implementation of a ceasefire agreement. Ultimately, the ICC arrest warrant became the means for France to try to regain influence over Lebanon, its former colony.

As the French political scene has become more polarized, Mr. Macron increasingly shoots from the hip, making grandiose statements, promising more than he can deliver and issuing contentious or contradictory declarations, only to back down at the potential expense of his allies.

There is much to be apprehensive about the French position, which ambitiously aims to restore its past colonial glory amid unprecedented domestic weakness. In the process, it might ensnare the U.S. in unnecessarily carrying water for its post-colonial agenda or leave Washington holding the bag.

• Janusz Bugajski is a senior fellow at the Jamestown Foundation in Washington and the author of the books “Pivotal Poland: Europe’s Rising Power” (2024) and “Failed State: A Guide to Russia’s Rupture” (2022).