U.S. military forces are not ready to respond to tactical nuclear weapons strikes by China in a protracted war, a recent Pentagon-funded study said.
China’s rapid expansion of nuclear forces, coupled with the dual conventional and nuclear warhead configuration of its missile forces, means it is more likely to employ low-yield nuclear attacks, according to the report from the Center for a New American Security.
“Broadly speaking, the emerging nuclear dynamics between the United States and China appear to have different dynamics than those between the United States and the Soviet Union and carry a greater risk of limited nuclear use,” reads a portion of the study, which was funded by the Pentagon’s Defense Threat Reduction Agency.
The extent of concern in national security circles over China’s nuclear capabilities came into sharper focus this week with reports that President Biden altered the U.S. strategic nuclear plans toward opposing China’s burgeoning nuclear arsenal and preparing for the possibility of nuclear coordination among China, Russia and North Korea.
The highly classified Nuclear Employment Guidance was altered in March without any public announcement, The New York Times reported Tuesday.
The Pentagon has placed a heavy focus on countering China’s nuclear arsenal. The Center for a New American Security report calls for the Defense Department to consider building nuclear-tipped anti-ship missiles to counter growing threats from the People’s Republic of China, or PRC.
The study is based on hypothetical non-strategic nuclear attacks conducted during two tabletop exercises, which are simulated war games conducted in conference rooms.
The exercises found that a lengthy war between the U.S. and China would set conditions for tactical nuclear weapons strikes that are “both appealing to the PRC and difficult to manage for the United States.”
“In a protracted conflict, nuclear use is unfortunately plausible as either a substitute for conventional arms or as a gamble for termination,” said Andrew Metrick, one of three co-authors of the report.
“In this future, the U.S. lacks the capabilities and concepts needed to achieve effective intra-war deterrence.”
The exercises found that tactical nuclear weapons use by both sides would continue during a war but not necessarily lead to a major nuclear exchange.
For China, low-yield missile and bomber attacks are more conducive to the Indo-Pacific region because of broad ocean geography and targets, compared with plans for tactical arms use in Europe during the Cold War.
“The United States lacks the doctrine, capabilities, and concepts to manage the conventional-nuclear crossfade,” said the report, using the film editing term to make one image fade as another appears.
“U.S. nuclear thinking and systems remain tied to the Cold War, and current capabilities suffer from a lack of signaling tools and employment difficulties.”
The study recommends expanding nuclear capabilities to bolster defenses.
“The United States likely lacks the theater nuclear capabilities necessary to engage in effective conflict management and forestall successful nuclear coercion,” the report said.
“For this reason, the United States should consider the development of a small number of nuclear-tipped anti-ship capabilities to increase the flexibility of U.S. theater nuclear capabilities and better align legacy Cold War capabilities with the Indo-Pacific age,” the study said.
21st-century weapons
America’s necessary weapons could include the nuclear-armed Long Range Anti-Ship Missile and Maritime Strike Tomahawk, as well as the W80-4 warhead, used for attacking ships.
Current U.S. advantages in conventional weapons could lead China to use its unknown number of tactical nuclear weapons in airbursts capable of inflicting damage over wide areas.
To resolve regional nuclear warfighting issues, U.S. military forces must fully integrate nuclear activities into planning and exercises, the report said, rather than regarding the options as “last day” or stand-alone exercises.
Reviving the Cold War skills for preparing for tactical nuclear war also would send a powerful signal to China that U.S. forces are alert to the threat of nuclear escalation and that Beijing will not gain advantages from such attacks.
“Given the inherent signaling limitations of ballistic missile submarines, the U.S. Air Force must develop the tactics, techniques, and procedures to move nonstrategic nuclear weapons quickly and safely to theater and mate with forward-deployed aircraft,” the report said.
Another way to reduce the potential for regional nuclear conflict is to improve the numbers and capabilities of advanced conventional arms.
U.S. tactical nuclear land-attack cruise missiles and other weapons were removed from U.S. warships in 1991 during the George H.W. Bush administration.
The current U.S. tactical nuclear weapons arsenal consists of about 230 B61 gravity bombs carried on jets.
The Trump administration in 2018 reversed a decision to retire nuclear-armed Tomahawk cruise missiles and called for deploying low-yield sea-launched cruise missiles, or SCLM-N, for use as nonstrategic regional forces.
The Trump administration also called for creating a low-yield W76 nuclear missile warhead for use on submarine-launched ballistic missiles.
Military commanders sought both tactical nuclear weapons to increase deterrence against China and Russia.
The Biden administration sought to defund the SLCM-N, but Congress rescued the program.
For allies, U.S. nuclear policy relies heavily on extended deterrence and on key regional partners such as Japan, South Korea and Australia to counter China’s buildup of regional missiles.
China could use its expanding nuclear forces in a coercive effort to break U.S. extended deterrence and ultimately undermine American alliances in the region, the report said. Greater coordination with Japan and Australia on responses to China’s use of nuclear weapons is needed, the report said.
The study recommends more engagement with China on nuclear weapons, but Beijing has refused U.S. requests to hold nuclear arms talks for several decades.
In June, the Chinese Foreign Ministry announced it was canceling nuclear arms and proliferation talks with the U.S. to protest American arms sales to Taiwan.
China’s nuclear ‘breakout’
Military commanders have described the Chinese nuclear expansion as a “breakout” from earlier military concepts, which centered on deploying a small warhead arsenal.
Chinese strategic stockpiles are estimated to have 500 warheads and will increase to as many as 1,500 by 2030. The number of tactical nuclear warheads is unknown.
The commander of U.S. Strategic Command, Air Force Gen. Anthony Cotton, testified to Congress in February that the size and rapid pace of Beijing’s nuclear buildup is “breathtaking.”
In the past five years, China’s nuclear expansion has included new mobile DF-31AG and DF-41 multiwarhead missiles, enhanced JL-3 submarine-launched missiles and modernized H-6N bombers.
The most dramatic increase was the deployment of more than 300 hardened intercontinental ballistic missile silos in western China.
“PRC leadership has clearly decided on markedly increasing their nuclear capabilities but has failed to explain the overarching strategic rationale for this expansion,” the Center for a New American Security report said.
The buildup increases the threat of misunderstanding and misperception, leading to a nuclear exchange, because Beijing has not explained the rationale for the expansion.
China’s DF-26 intermediate-range missile is a nuclear weapon of particular concern. Beijing has dubbed the DF-26 a “Guam killer” because it was designed to target the U.S. military hub on the American Pacific island.
“While details on PLA thinking remain sparse, small-yield, precise nonstrategic nuclear arms neatly fit into the PLA’s conventional warfighting approaches and are being discussed in Chinese military writings,” the report said.
• Bill Gertz can be reached at bgertz@washingtontimes.com.
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