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China’s military is building up forces for an attack on Taiwan that could take place in the coming years as part of a campaign by President Xi Jinping for “national rejuvenation,” according to the latest Pentagon’s annual report on the Chinese military.
The report, based on declassified intelligence from the Defense Intelligence Agency, military and other spy services, provides the most detailed U.S. government assessment made public to date of Chinese plans for military action against the self-ruled, democratic island Beijing claims as its territory.
China “continues to signal its willingness to use military force against Taiwan” while asserting it seeks a peaceful solution to cross-strait ties, the report noted.
China increased political and military pressure on Taiwan last year that continued this year with stepped-up provocative and destabilizing actions in and around the Taiwan Strait, the report said.
“The PLA has a range of options to coerce Taipei based on its increasing capabilities in multiple domains,” the annual assessment concludes.
One new weapons system near Taiwan disclosed in the report is a long-range multiple rocket artillery system that was tested during war games held near Taiwan in August 2022. Military analyst Tom Shugart said the new rocket system allows the PLA to target the entire island of Taiwan from areas along the Chinese mainland coast.
“This means the PLA [army] can hit those key spots with much larger numbers of rockets, requiring less help from the PLA [air force] or the PLA [rocket force] and saving those services’ munitions for targets further afield,” Mr. Shugart, with the Center for New American Security said in a post on social media. “It’s just one of a number of invasion-related capabilities the PLA practiced using.”
The People’s Liberation Army is planning a range of operations, including cyberattacks, a naval blockade around Taiwan and multiple types of “kinetic” military attacks. The goal of the operations would be to force Taiwan to capitulate to unification with the mainland, or to compel Taiwanese leaders to negotiate on Beijing’s terms.
Deterring the U.S.
A key element of PLA strategy is to deter anticipated U.S. military intervention on behalf of Taiwan.
The failure to prevent U.S. entry into a future Taiwan conflict would result in a “limited war of short duration” designed to delay or defeat U.S. and allied military intervention.
President Biden has said several times that U.S. military forces would intervene to defend Taiwan against a Chinese military attack, a flat statement that the White House insists does not represent a shift in official U.S. policy.
The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act requires the president to notify Congress of threats to Taiwan, and states that “the president and the Congress shall determine, in accordance with constitutional processes, appropriate action by the United States in response to any such danger.”
The Pentagon report said in the event of a protracted war over Taiwan, the PLA might escalate the conflict with major cyberattacks, attacks against satellites, or “nuclear activities” designed to win. It may also seek just to fight to a stalemate and seek a political settlement.
The report lists several options likely being offered to Mr. Xi singly or in combination, with varying degrees of risk for the ruling Chinese Communist Party.
Beijing’s leaders regard taking over Taiwan, which broke with the mainland when Nationalist forces fled to the island in 1949 after China’s civil war, as central to Mr. Xi’s ideology-driven program of national rejuvenation.
A key part of the rejuvenation campaign is to take Taiwan by 2049, the 100th anniversary of the CCP. Rejuvenation is also based on Mr. Xi’s vision for China becoming a superpower, a status that he has said requires a “full reunification.”
Tensions remain high across the 100-mile-wide Taiwan Strait.
Adm. John Aquilino, commander of the Indo Pacific Command, said recently that China is studying conflicts in both Ukraine and Israel for lessons that might apply to designs for a military move against Taiwan.
U.S. forces in the region include two aircraft carrier strike groups and other military forces tasked with two missions, Adm. Aquilino said — to deter China from attacking Taiwan or to defeat and win a war if deterrence fails.
“The PLA practiced elements of each of these military options during its August 2022 large-scale military exercise aimed at pressuring Taiwan, and again in April 2023 in response to Taiwan president Tsai Ing-wen’s transit of the United States,” the new Pentagon report said.
The first option would be a PLA air and maritime blockade designed to cut off vital imports to Taiwan and force Taipei to capitulate. The joint blockade would use large-scale missile strikes and possible seizures of Taiwan’s offshore islands close to the mainland coast.
The PLA air and naval forces would conduct blockade operations for weeks or months if needed, and electronic warfare, networks and other information warfare would be used to isolate Taiwan and control an international narrative about the conflict.
A second option would involve the limited use of force or coercive options including disruptive, punitive, or lethal military attacks in a small-scale operation. That operation would be backed by overt and clandestine economic and political operations to shape global views and undermine Taiwan authorities’ legitimacy.
As during a blockade, the PLA would use computer network attacks along with limited military strikes on political, military, and economic infrastructure in Taiwan. The objective: create fear in Taiwan and degrade popular confidence in the government.
In limited operations, the plans call for PLA special operations commandos to infiltrate Taiwan and carry out sabotage attacks on infrastructure or leadership targets.
A third option outlined in the report would deploy major warplane and missile attacks. This option calls for using precision missile and airstrikes on key targets such as government facilities. Military targets will include strikes on air bases, radar sites, missiles, space assets and communications facilities.
Fourth, the PLA is planning an amphibious invasion along the lines set forth in previous military writings.
“The most prominent of these, the joint island landing campaign, envisions a complex operation relying on coordinated, interlocking campaigns for [electronic warfare], logistics, air and naval support,” the report said. The object would be to break down shore defenses on Taiwan and build up combat power on the western coast and seize key targets.
A key element of the amphibious assault would be the use of civilian car ferries, an option tested in October 2022 when seven ferries took part in military landing drills on Chinese beaches.
Practice for this option took place in August 2022, when the PLA conducted short-notice military drills to protest the visit by then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan.
The joint exercises at the time practiced PLA gaining air, maritime and information “superiority,” the report said.
“A large-scale amphibious invasion would be one of the most complicated and difficult military operations for the PLA, requiring air and maritime superiority, the rapid buildup and sustainment of supplies onshore, and uninterrupted support,” the report said. “It would likely strain the [Chinese] armed forces and invite a strong international response.”
Risks for Xi
The report said the difficulties that would involve the loss of large numbers of PLA forces, likely urban warfare and Taiwan counterinsurgency pose a significant political and military risk for Mr. Xi and the ruling Communist Party, the report said.
The last option for the PLA would be a campaign of small island takeovers. These PLA activities would be amphibious operations short of a full-scale invasion.
Taiwan has 22 islands west of the main island, some of which were targeted by PLA artillery during the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis.
“With few overt military preparations beyond routine training, the PRC could launch an invasion of small Taiwan-occupied islands in the [South China Sea], such as Pratas or Itu Aba,” the report said. “A PLA invasion of a medium-sized, better-defended island, such as Matsu or Kinmen, is also within the PLA’s capabilities.”
Small island invasions would show PLA military capability and political resolve while making territorial gain at the same time demonstrating restraint, the report said. But the political risks for China would still be high, since the seizures would galvanize pro-independence sentiment in Taiwan and increase international opposition to Beijing.
The report said that Beijing’s calculations for an attack focus on leadership perceptions of domestic and international support for military action, the impact of sanctions following an attack, and whether the PLA invasion will achieve its objectives.
The Pentagon said Chinese forces increased their posture along the Taiwan Strait with new weapons, mobile forces and rapid strike capabilities.
Recent stepped-up training for amphibious attack shows Taiwan remains a high-priority target for the PLA, the report said. PLA army training operations last year sought to refine the military’s rapid loading, long-distance transport and beach assault plans designed for Taiwan attacks.
The PLA navy “is improving its anti-air, anti-surface, and [anti-submarine warfare] capabilities, further developing an at-sea nuclear deterrence, and introducing new multi-mission platforms capable of conducting diverse missions during peace and war.”
Attack by air
Air power includes large numbers of advanced aircraft that can strike targets in Taiwan without refueling. The attack capability was described in the report as significant.
Missile forces are ready for attacks on leadership targets, command and control facilities, air bases and radar sites, the report said.
“As of 2023, the [PLA Rocket Force] is increasing its presence along the Taiwan Strait with new missile brigades, possibly indicating an increasing number of deployed missiles,” the report said.
The relatively new PLA strategic support force would launch electronic and cyberspace attacks against Taiwan in a conflict.
The report said Taiwan’s ability to deter a mainland attack continues to erode, although Ukraine’s success in turning back the first waves of Russia’s invasion last year prompted Taipei to explore asymmetric warfare tools to counter growing PLA power.
The island government is building war reserve stocks, improving defense industry and practicing joint operations and crisis response efforts. But the improvements “only partially address its defense challenges,” the report said, adding that the military is struggling with equipment and readiness problems.
Chinese military forces added ground, air and naval forces opposite Taiwan, according to a comparison of the deployments from last year’s report.
The forces are deployed with the eastern and southern theater commands that would be involved in what the report said would be “direct action” operations against the island.
For example, the People’s Liberation Army added one combined arms brigade near Taiwan for a total of 31 brigades each with up to 5,000 troops. The brigades include six capable of conducting amphibious operations.
According to the report, China now has an estimated 420,000 troops near Taiwan, an increase of 4,000 troops from last year. By comparison, Taiwan’s armed forces consist of 89,000 troops.
PLA naval forces near Taiwan also grew with the addition of an amphibious assault ship to the two existing cross-strait assault ships. Added warships near Taiwan included two cruisers, and six destroyers, that were added to the existing force three cruisers, and 24 destroyers.
Air forces added to the area include 50 fighters for a force of 750 jets and 50 bombers for a force of 300 bombers. Air transports near Taiwan increased by 20 aircraft for a total of 40 planes used for intelligence collection, airborne warning and control and surveillance.
Chinese rocket forces that likely would be used in a conflict over Taiwan also grew sharply over the past year, the report said. The number of intercontinental-range missiles grew from 300 to 350 missiles, and intermediate-range missiles were doubled from 250 to 500, the report said.
Medium-range missiles, those with ranges of between 620 and 1,800 miles also increased with the fielding of 500 additional missiles to a total force of 1,000 missiles.
Short-range missiles also increased from 600 last year to 1,000 today, and ground-launched cruise missile forces added 50 new launchers for its 300 land-attack missiles.
• Bill Gertz can be reached at bgertz@washingtontimes.com.
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