Asian democracies reluctant to freeze out China while embracing U.S.

SEOUL, South Korea — The U.S. effort to unite partners and allies across Asia in a strong anti-China alliance is proving divisive.

Anglosphere allies Australia and Britain appear firmly in sync with U.S. policy in the Indo-Pacific, but several other regional democracies courted by Washington are far more conflicted.

In a regional arms race, the conventional strategic wisdom — beef up deterrence against the emerging superpower rival — carries collateral peril, topped by the increased risk of accidental clashes and a subsequent escalatory spiral into open conflict.

While China-U.S. bilateral relations are dire, the risks for smaller regional players are magnified by a lack of communication channels and mechanisms to subdue a crisis.

Those doubts and concerns were on display at the Oct. 17-19 Seoul Defense Dialogue, which brought policymakers, military officials and analysts from around the region and beyond to South Korea’s capital.

Choosing sides

“The global rules-based order is under enormous pressure,” Australian Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles told the gathering. “And as great-power military competition plays out, there is a very significant buildup of military capabilities.”

While China muscles up in all domains, notably through a rapid expansion of its navy, North Korea is expanding its nuclear assets and adopting more aggressive doctrines for unleashing them. In response, South Korea and Japan are acquiring new missile forces and developing homegrown stealth fighters. Australia recently reached a landmark deal with the U.S. and Britain to field its own nuclear submarine fleet.

One fear is that Washington will lack the bandwidth to sustain its presence in the Indo-Pacific, given the hot wars in Ukraine and the Middle East consuming the Biden administration’s attention and budgetary plans.

“We will continue to encourage the U.S. to be as engaged as possible in the East Asia time zone,” said Mr. Marles. “We see that as really important to the collective security of the Indo-Pacific.”

Annabel Goldie, the British minister of state for defense, blamed Beijing for the region’s widening divisions.

“China is an epoch-defining competitor and no longer observes fundamental tenets such as freedom of navigation,” said the baroness, a member of the House of Lords.

Some 60% of global trade passes through Indo-Pacific waters. Although China has not interfered with maritime commerce so far, its construction of air-sea bases on disputed reefs in the South China Sea and the sometimes aggressive behavior of its fishing fleets have alarmed its neighbors.

London deployed a carrier strike group with U.S. F-35 fighter jets on deck to the Indo-Pacific in 2021 and will repeat the exercise in 2025. A group destroyer nettled Beijing by sailing through the Taiwan Strait.

“The U.K. has indicated that aggressive behavior toward Taiwan is not acceptable,” Ms. Goldie said. “If there is disruption and instability at the end of the day, it does not help anybody.”

Echoing U.S. defense officials and local commanders, she said it is vital to preserve a deterrent strength to check Chinese aggression. “If you want peace, prepare for war,” she said. “That is a fundamental wisdom that has endured down the ages.”

Skeptics of that view say strong deterrence carries risks.

“There are two paths to conflict in this region: one state against another and [by] accident,” said James Crabtree, executive director of the Asia offices of the International Institute of Strategic Studies. “Reinforced deterrence arguably increases risk of accidents.”

Hedging bets

The region is complex. The clear security alignments in Northeast Asia — where Japan, South Korea and the U.S. face off against China, North Korea and Russia — are not replicated elsewhere.

“Northeast Asia is unusual, almost unique, in that every player in the region knows what side it’s on,” said Mr. Crabtree. “That is not true in the [rest of the] Pacific, where most countries seek not to choose.”

China’s military might and economic clout require more caution and balance, some officials say.

“ASEAN simply cannot afford to choose sides,” said Heng Chee How, the Singaporean senior minister of state for defense, referring to the alliance of 10 Southeast Asian countries. “The U.S. has a long-standing presence in the region and the region has prospered under that security umbrella, but China is the largest trading partner of every ASEAN country.”

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, as a bloc, would rank as the world’s fifth-largest economy, and much of its prosperity depends on access to Chinese markets and suppliers.

“It’s a balance between security and economics. Both are important,” said Mr. Heng. “Sovereignty is important, friendship is important. … ASEAN does not want to be forced into a position of taking sides.”

Pio Tikoduadua, Fijian minister for home affairs and immigration, echoed Mr. Heng’s plea at the conference. Fiji is an emerging hot spot in the South Pacific where Beijing and Washington are vying openly for influence.

“It is hard for us to choose, and we do not want to choose,” said Mr. Tikoduadua, spelling out the agony of small states caught between mightier powers.

“We do not have much flexibility, we don’t possess capabilities, but we are principled …,” he said. Fijians “expect the world to carry its own weight in terms of looking after us.”

Above all, Mr. Heng said, the Indo-Pacific must “remain open and inclusive.”

While many in Washington are discussing decoupling from China and creating new alliances to restrain its growth, Mr. Heng said “substantive cooperation will be a win-win and will motivate the right behaviors.”

The deconfliction dilemma

“Any concept of security that does not include mitigation is no security at all,” Mr. Tikoduadua said.

That is easier said than done.

Mr. Crabtree said House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s August 2022 visit to Taiwan, which sparked an intense Chinese intimidation campaign against Taipei, “was not deterrence, and most Southeast Asian nations did not see it as helpful.”

China also is at fault, he said.

“There are lots of measures that could be taken but not many signs, especially on the Chinese side, that they see utility in opening channels of cooperation,” Mr. Crabtree said.

At the International Institute of Strategic Studies’ June forum in Singapore, then-Chinese Defense Secretary Li Shangfu declined to meet with U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, who nevertheless approached Mr. Li at a dinner and shook his hand.

The Pentagon said at the time that it believes “in maintaining open lines of military-to-military communication with [China] — and will continue to seek meaningful military-to-military discussions at multiple levels to responsibly manage the relationship.”

Mr. Marles endorsed that approach.

“It is really important that the quality of dialogue and diplomacy, the guardrails, is as excellent as it can be,” he said. “We need the greatest possible communications between the U.S. and China so there is no miscalculation or mistake.”