OPINION:
An impending Ukrainian army counteroffensive has predominated war news in recent weeks. It’s not a new topic, but one that has fueled a surge in providing military arms to Ukraine by the administration of President Biden. As he was during the Afghanistan debacle, he has been a hesitant warrior in this process.
That has elongated the war in Ukraine as it did the misery in Afghanistan. Far better would have been a robust response supporting Ukraine immediately after Russia’s flagrant violation of its sovereignty. That is preferable to a halting and uncertain posture, an inexcusable miscalculation that was exhibited by then-President Barack Obama in 2014, when he balked while Russia unlawfully seized Crimea. Mr. Biden was present then also, predictably supportive of a tepid response.
With that in mind, we’re now faced with the possibility that — despite the unnecessary hiccups by Mr. Biden and the oozing hesitation by some in Congress — Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s better-armed and better-prepared army is on the verge of a major spring counteroffensive.
What should we expect?
First, it will be violent. Wars are, and to date, this one has been largely characterized by bloody attrition on both sides. Artillery warfare has dominated this clash, but so too has much innovation by the Ukrainians, particularly in the use of unmanned aerial systems, or drones, that are armed and deadly.
U.S. Army leaders are taking note of these major innovations as we reshape our own military for future conflict, particularly one that may occur with a rising Chinese behemoth. Nonetheless, the Ukrainian counteroffensive will continue to highlight the nature of violence in combat, particularly since Ukraine will likely suffer more casualties when on the offensive than they normally would when dug in on the defensive as they’ve been during the winter.
Second, a Ukrainian counteroffensive will likely display not only the effectiveness of Western machines of war but also the battlefield tactics, techniques and procedures that the U.S. and our North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies have perfected for years to deter or counter Russian aggression in Europe.
Consequently, a Ukrainian counteroffensive serves as a proxy to test our combat doctrine and equipment. As cynical as it may be, the provision of Western arms and battlefield know-how to Ukraine is a good investment in defeating the single greatest threat to European peace and U.S. interests there without spilling a drop of American or NATO blood. Some opinion leaders cannot understand that obvious reality.
Third, it’s entirely possible that Russia will fight a last-ditch effort to withstand Ukrainian gains. After all, there is a “quality to quantity” factor in warfare, and Russia — despite its ham-handed approach to this war — dominates in the “quantity” category, particularly in deadly missile, rocket and cannon artillery forces.
Moreover, in recent months, Russian forces have entrenched and deployed an impressive array of obstacles athwart the path of a likely Ukrainian assault. There is nonetheless the real possibility that Ukraine will effectively use artillery firepower and coordinated ground maneuvering to uproot Russian defenses, bypass them, or overrun retreating Russian soldiers, a pattern seen in past Ukrainian battlefield advances.
Fourth, what will Ukraine capture if it’s successful? That may well include a large swath of territory southeast of the Dnipro River and the now-liberated city of Kherson. That could, in turn, create an opportunity to put so much pressure on the enemy that a collapse of Russian resolve in Crimea could result in a stunning return of that region to Ukraine, its lawful owner.
This is where this war gets very interesting for the combatants, the U.S., and our NATO partners. At some point, the conditions to call a cease-fire will be ripe, and Western powers must be adroit in recognizing when that occurs. Waiting until it emerges is not the time to do serious thinking here. Let’s hope that our national leaders on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean are pondering this before it’s dropped in their lap like a hot ball of artillery-delivered white phosphorus.
We must consider now how we encourage Ukraine to recognize success when it achieves it, and that may be short of Mr. Zelenskyy’s bold vision. A significant recapture of Ukrainian territory short of a total Russian collapse might offer an opportunity to set the conditions for peace.
Some history is instructive here. In the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Israeli forces had the Egyptian Third Army surrounded on the banks of the Suez Canal, ready for annihilation, when the U.S. stepped in to stop what would have been a bloodbath. Doing so set the conditions for eventual peace between Israel and Egypt with the 1978 Camp David Accords.
Some history might be worth repeating.
• L. Scott Lingamfelter is a retired Army colonel and author of “Desert Redleg: Artillery Warfare in the First Gulf War” (University Press of Kentucky). His new book, “Yanks in Blue Berets: American UN Peacekeepers in the Middle East,” will be released by UPK on 4 July.
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