Preventing conflict in the South China Sea and the Korean Peninsula

OPINION:

At a Track 2 conference (former officials and academics) with China on U.S.-China relations, convened after the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, or APEC, conference in San Francisco, one of the subjects discussed was the need to avoid military confrontation.

There was considerable discussion about tension in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait and the need to establish rules of engagement to reduce risks in maritime encounters.

A good portion of that discussion dealt with the ongoing pressure from China on the Philippines in the South China Sea and China’s interference with Philippine efforts to resupply a small Philippine garrison on the Second Thomas Shoal.

Cited were Chinese coast guard vessels and fishing boats actively interfering with Philippine efforts to resupply the garrison, disabling a Philippine vessel with water cannons, and colliding with another Philippine vessel. In response, the U.S. made it clear to China that an armed attack against Philippine forces would activate the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty.

Most thought that tension in the South China Sea could quickly and unexpectedly escalate, with the potential for eventual conflict. Indeed, the sense was that it was the South China Sea that required immediate attention. Tension in the Taiwan Strait with the island democracy’s coming presidential elections in January was also of concern, especially given Chinese naval and air activities around Taiwan.

All agreed that restoring leadership communications and military-to-military relations were positive deliverables from the summit of President Biden and Chinese leader Xi Jinping at the APEC conference.

But it will be incumbent on these senior officials, with expanded communications with Cabinet and lower-level officials, to ensure that our two countries don’t stumble into accidental conflict and war due to misunderstanding or miscommunication related to developments in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait.

Also discussed was the exponential escalation of North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities and the potential for conflict on the Korean Peninsula and throughout Northeast Asia. China’s leadership role in convening the Six-Party Talks with North Korea was discussed, with some commentary on the value of China again working with the U.S. to get North Korea back to the negotiating table.

These and other issues were discussed, including Russia’s invasion of and war with Ukraine and Hamas’ Oct. 7 terrorist attack on Israel, killing more than 1,200 Israeli and foreign nationals and taking 236 hostages. Economic challenges, climate change and managing artificial intelligence were other issues discussed, all requiring greater U.S.-China collaboration.

The main takeaway from this conference was the imperative to enhance bilateral and multilateral dialogue and cooperation, with a focus on reducing existential threats and fostering regional and global stability and security.

Indeed, witnessing Russia’s war in Ukraine, with significant casualties and suffering, and Israel’s war with the Hamas terrorist organization, and the heavy casualties and suffering in Israel and Gaza, it’s doubly important that the U.S. and China work harder at ensuring that we not only prevent any future conflict between our two countries in the South China Sea or Taiwan Strait but that we also collaborate to end ongoing conflicts and prevent the potential for a future war on the Korean Peninsula.

As we correctly analyze what more we could have done to prevent Russia from invading Ukraine and what preemptive actions could have been taken to prevent Hamas from its barbaric attack on Israeli civilians on Oct. 7, future generations will look back on how well we managed U.S.-China relations to ensure that conflict was prevented, and cooperation was enhanced for the common good of all nations.

• Joseph R. DeTrani served as special envoy for the Six-Party Talks with North Korea from 2003 to 2006 and as director of the National Counterproliferation Center. The views expressed here are the author’s and not those of any government agency or department.