A version of this story appeared in the daily Threat Status newsletter from The Washington Times. Click here to receive Threat Status delivered directly to your inbox each weekday.
China has fully militarized at least three islands it built in the disputed South China Sea and is now looking around the world to establish a network of naval bases to bolster its ability to project power and match the global reach of the U.S. Navy.
Beijing’s first overseas naval base, situated in the small country of Djibouti on the Horn of Africa and operational since 2017, has given it a foothold in the Arabian Sea. National security experts are speculating about the next outpost.
The most likely possibilities are Sri Lanka, where Beijing has made its largest overseas commercial port investment in the past decade, and Equatorial Guinea, which is strategically located on West Africa’s Atlantic coast and could put Chinese naval assets squarely in America’s backyard.
Researchers at the College of William & Mary, giving a presentation Tuesday at The Heritage Foundation, said it’s just a matter of time before Chinese warships operate in faraway waters.
The Pentagon has warned since 2021 that China boasts the world’s largest maritime military fleet in terms of warships. Although weaker than the U.S. Navy in power, weaponry and sophistication, the People’s Liberation Army Navy has more than 355 platforms compared with roughly 300 warships in the American fleet.
“It’s inevitable that the growth of the Chinese navy is going to continue in the next decade,” said Alexander Wooley, who manages communications for William & Mary’s AidData research lab, which produced the assessment.
“They’re going to increase the number of ships,” said Mr. Wooley, a former British Royal Navy officer. “So, it’s a little bit hard to imagine that there [aren’t] going to be overseas naval bases in addition to Djibouti.”
Although China has the resources and the global economic interests that justify a global navy, Brent Sadler, a senior research fellow at The Heritage Foundation, said it is difficult to predict where Beijing will focus its base expansion efforts.
Mr. Sadler said China might militarize ports that received massive funding from its Belt and Road foreign investment campaign and that Beijing’s goal of controlling Taiwan could factor into locations.
“The main operational focus is on a war over Taiwan,” said Mr. Sadler. He added that the Chinese navy’s current capabilities will likely factor into the types of bases that Beijing will pursue.
International media are more often focused on China’s military muscle-flexing in the South China Sea. Last year, the top U.S. military commander in the region warned that Beijing has been busy arming its man-made islands with anti-ship and anti-aircraft missile systems, laser and jamming equipment, and fighter jets.
Adm. John C. Aquilino, commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, said in March 2022 that the hostile actions have starkly contrasted with Chinese President Xi Jinping’s assurances that Beijing would not transform the artificial islands in contested waters into military bases.
“I think over the past 20 years we’ve witnessed the largest military buildup since World War II by the PRC,” Adm. Aquilino said at the time, using China’s formal name. “They have advanced all their capabilities, and that buildup of weaponization is destabilizing to the region.”
Chinese officials shot back by saying Beijing has the right to develop South China Sea islands as it sees fit.
Great power competition
National security debates about the great power competition between Washington and Beijing often leave out more theoretical questions about how China might one day challenge America’s global military footprint and dominance.
The U.S. outstrips all other nations by maintaining hundreds of bases in some 85 countries. Even so, the prospect of an expanding band of Chinese navy bases is a concern in Washington.
A U.S. Army commander made headlines in 2021 by asserting that China was quietly establishing a major naval port on the west coast of Africa that would host Chinese submarines and aircraft carriers capable of projecting Beijing’s military power directly into the Atlantic.
“They’re looking for a place where they can rearm and repair warships,” said Gen. Stephen Townsend, head of Africa Command at the time. He said Beijing was close to establishing a facility at its base in Djibouti.
The status of such operations is not clear, given the lack of transparency for outsiders to Chinese military plans.
The recent assessment produced by the William & Mary researchers examined several factors, including the status of ports and infrastructure financed by Chinese state-owned entities in dozens of low- and middle-income countries from 2000 to 2021.
The assessment, which ranks “eight leading options” for naval bases, looked at the recipients of nearly $30 billion invested by Chinese state-owned entities since the turn of the century. The money was used to finance 123 projects to expand or construct 78 ports in 46 countries, including nearly $2 billion in the Sri Lankan port of Hambantota.
“While our data is neither exhaustive nor definitive, we suggest a list of port locations — where China has invested significant resources and maintains relationships with local elites — that may be favorable for future naval bases,” the assessment’s authors wrote.
Sri Lanka topped the list, followed by Equatorial Guinea, Pakistan, Cameroon, Cambodia, Vanuatu, Mozambique and Mauritania.
The rankings are based on factors that may weigh heavily within Beijing’s calculus. The assessment said Mauritania’s “proximity to Europe and key chokepoints make it an attractive option,” while Mozambique features “a deepwater port with sizable Chinese investment, providing potential for a naval base location on East Africa’s coast.”
“China’s potential plans for establishing overseas naval bases present profound implications and options for both itself and the West,” the assessment said. “In the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, increased coordination between the Kremlin and Beijing has put the prospect of Chinese naval bases under intense scrutiny from the U.S. and its allies.
“China must [also] balance protecting its global maritime interests with avoiding accusations of colonialism — perhaps an impossible needle to thread,” the authors wrote. “An important caveat for China is that none of the ports described [in the assessment] is currently militarily defensible. In a conflict situation, they would become high-value targets for an enemy.”
• Guy Taylor can be reached at gtaylor@washingtontimes.com.
Please read our comment policy before commenting.