China should play larger role in getting North Korea to scrap nuclear program

OPINION:

In Track 2 (former government officials and academics) discussions with the Chinese, when North Korea is discussed, the 2003-2009 Six-Party Talks are cited by the Chinese participants as a model for resolving the nuclear issue with North Korea.

Here’s some background, and why China should again play a leading role in getting North Korea to agree to complete and verifiable denuclearization, despite North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s stated goal of building more nuclear weapons.

China hosted, and Foreign Minister Wang Yi was the first chairperson for the Six-Party Talks negotiations with North Korea, with the U.S., South Korea, North Korea, China, Japan and Russia all participating.

After two years of working group meetings and plenary sessions, on Sept. 19, 2005, at the fourth plenary session, a Joint Statement was signed that stated, among other things, that “the six parties unanimously reaffirmed that the goal of the Six-Party Talks is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner and the DPRK (North Korea) committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning, at an early date, to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and IAEA safeguards.”

“The U.S. affirmed it has no nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula and has no intention to attack or invade the DPRK with nuclear or conventional weapons … and the Six Parties undertook to promote economic cooperation in the fields of energy, trade and investment, bilaterally and/or multilaterally.” And “the Six Parties agreed to take coordinated steps to implement the aforementioned consensus in a phased manner in line with the principle of ‘commitment for commitment, action for action.’”

Despite this Joint Statement, in July 2006, North Korea launched ballistic missiles. On Oct. 9, 2006, North Korea conducted its first nuclear test, all ostensibly because the U.S. sanctioned a Macao bank, Banco Delta Asia, as a primary money laundering concern working with North Korea, pursuant to Section 311 of the Patriot Act.

When North Korea eventually had access to the $25 million that the bank initially froze, in February 2007, North Korea agreed to shut down and seal, for eventual abandonment, the Yongbyon nuclear complex. In July 2007, International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors arrived and confirmed the shutdown of the five nuclear sites in Yongbyon, applying seals and other surveillance and monitoring equipment.

This all ended abruptly when on April 16, 2009, all IAEA inspectors were told to leave North Korea. North Korea made this decision when the IAEA inspectors had asked to visit undeclared suspect nuclear sites in North Korea, a routine request that North Korea should have approved if it had nothing to hide.

But apparently, North Korea did have something to hide: its highly enriched uranium sites for nuclear weapons.

That was the end of the Six-Party Talks, after six years of negotiations and some progress, with a comprehensive Joint Statement committing North Korea to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and progress with the dismantling of the Yongbyon nuclear complex, including the public destruction of its 60-foot cooling tower.

We all know what followed: North Korea’s five other nuclear tests and the incessant launching of short-range, intermediate range and intercontinental ballistic missiles, in addition to cruise, hypersonic and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

So far in 2023, North Korea has launched three ICBMs, the latest, on July 12, was a successful launch of a Hwasong-18 solid fuel ICBM with a range of 15,000 kilometers (9,320 miles). A seventh nuclear test could be imminent.

At an Aug. 9 Central Military Commission meeting, Chairman Kim Jong Un announced the removal of Gen. Pak Su il, the chief of general staff of the Korean People’s Army, after seven months in the job. He was replaced by Gen. Ri Yong Gil, the former chief of general staff.

In an official Korean Central News Agency announcement, Mr. Kim ordered the military to step up war preparations “in an offensive way,” while discussing plans against its unnamed enemy.

The Sept. 19, 2005, Joint Statement’s first sentence states: “For the cause of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia at large, the Six Parties held, in the spirit of mutual respect and equality, serious and practical talks concerning the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”

This would be an appropriate time for China to seek U.S. support to reconstitute the Six-Party Talks. China did this in 2003, at the request of the U.S., and it can do this in 2023, taking the initiative to ensure that intentional or accidental war doesn’t erupt on the Korean Peninsula.

Indeed, China is North Korea’s only ally, and North Korea relies on China for its economic survival. Getting North Korea to return to these talks while halting all missile launches, nuclear tests, and the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons would be a significant contribution to lowering tension on the Korean Peninsula.

It would also demonstrate to the international community that the U.S. and China can and will collaborate on issues for the common good.

• Joseph R. DeTrani is the former special envoy for Six-Party Talks with North Korea and the former director of the National Counterproliferation Center. The views are the author’s and not those of any government agency or department.