OPINION:
In the current overheated Sino-U.S. geopolitical competition chessboard, Vietnam represents a high geostrategic value rook for controlling the Southeast Asian region and the South China Sea geo-maritime space.
In a run-up to Chinese President Xi Jinping’s formal visit scheduled later this month to Hanoi and in advance of President Biden’s plans in early September, Washington and Beijing are stepping up their respective political-economic pressures on the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, placing Hanoi in the crosshairs of this high-stakes maneuvering.
The White House recognizes that its Comprehensive Relationship With Vietnam, now in its 10th year, must move to a strategic level sooner rather than later.
Both nations understand that there’s a clear and present danger if a rules-based international order in the contested South China Sea is not upheld and China’s domination of the Indo-Pacific becomes a reality.
China’s actions in the South China Sea have led the United States and Vietnam to intensify security collaboration.
This past spring, Secretary of State Antony Blinken underscored in a speech in Hanoi the close relationship between the United States and Vietnam, once fierce enemies and now friends.
“I am here to further broaden and deepen that partnership, following Mr. Biden’s call with General Secretary [Nguyen Phu] Trong and building on earlier high-level visits, including from Vice President [Kamala] Harris, Secretary of Defense [Lloyd] Austin, U.S. Trade Representative [Katherine] Tai, USAID Administrator [Samantha] Power, and recently as well, members of Congress.”
The two countries are collaborating on a wide range of shared interests, including trade, clean energy transition, climate change initiatives, public health, dioxin cleanup from the war, Mekong Delta water issues, and South China Sea security.
Although not quite overnight, Hanoi has marched forward and become a member of the Association of Asian Nations, or ASEAN, in 1995 and Asia Pacific Economic Forum, known as APEC, in 1998.
Certainly, a central part of its acceptance and integration into the global community was the normalization of relations between the U.S. and Vietnam in 1995.
It has been 50 years since U.S. and Vietnamese diplomats met in Paris to sign the historic “peace accords” ending the Vietnam War.
From the perspectives of both nations, the legacies of war have forged a path of reconciliation that involves joint efforts to clear unexploded ordnance and cleanup of dioxin hot spots from the war.
The U.S. government recently announced a new $73 million contract to treat contaminated soil and sediment at Bien Hoa Air Base, the largest remaining Agent Orange contaminant site in Vietnam.
In addition, over the course of the Lower Mekong Initiative, from 2009 to 2020, the State Department and the Agency for International Development provided nearly $3.5 billion in assistance to five Mekong countries: Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam.
In the midst of the celebratory run-up of this comprehensive partnership, the scheduled construction of a $350 million embassy compound marks another cornerstone of the U.S. commitment to Vietnam.
The framework for these actions is shaped largely by Washington’s concerns to give Southeast Asia higher priority in foreign policy and to engage more deeply with the region.
A new report prepared by the Working Group on Southeast Asia of the Task Force on U.S.-China Policy, “Prioritizing Southeast Asia in American China Strategy,” unpacks data that shows most ASEAN nations view their region’s economic relationship with China favorably, but concern grows about China’s influence and strategic positioning.
Vietnam understands its neighbor China and continues to chart a safe navigation course to steer clear of the major power competition between Beijing and Washington. The U.S. relationship benefits with Vietnam should not be viewed solely from a political-security perspective.
In the context of Vietnam’s implementation of a balanced foreign policy and Hanoi’s declared “four nos” policy: no military alliances, no forward bases, no aligning with a second country against a third, and no use of force in international relations, Washington needs to focus more on less-sensitive issues, including recognizing Vietnam’s market economy, supporting Vietnam’s deeper engagement in the global supply chain, developing the semiconductor industry, and cooperating on climate change mitigation.
Some White House foreign policy strategists believe that China’s militarization of the South China Sea and its continued violations of Vietnam’s sovereignty, especially in the Spratly Islands, may shift Vietnam’s hedging policy toward Pennsylvania Avenue.
It helps that the U.S. has prioritized bilateral maritime assistance by providing four new coast guard patrol vessels, aerial surveillance drones, coastal radar, and two decommissioned U.S. Coast Guard Hamilton Class cutters. All this fits in with the administration’s policy of helping Vietnam challenge China’s power projection capabilities.
In this scenario, it’s conceivable that Vietnam could very well move closer to the U.S. This would certainly make it easier for the U.S. Navy to conduct military operations to maintain freedom of navigation and develop sea control in key areas of the contested SCS from the Taiwan Strait, Luzon, Malacca, and the Spratly and Paracel islands.
Nevertheless, Beijing counters where it matters through soft diplomacy by increasing its foreign direct investment in Vietnam. With over $2.52 billion invested, Chinese investors trail only those of Singapore, Korea and Japan.
What does all this signal? Both Washington and Beijing will continue to exert diplomatic pressure on Hanoi now and in the near term future to gain their confidence and trust.
However, the memories are still fresh for many when America failed to win “hearts and minds “as they became mired in Vietnam.
For now, like a chess master, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam assumes a waiting move and knows it is not in its best interests to be a pawn.
• James Borton is a senior fellow at Johns Hopkins/SAIS and the author of “Dispatches From the South China Sea: Navigating to Common Ground.”
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