Asia game-plans for China-Taiwan shooting war as U.S. troops increasingly isolated

First of two parts.

SEOUL, South Korea — Defense will almost certainly be on the agenda if and when Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen, now visiting Guatemala, defies Chinese warnings and meets with House Speaker Kevin McCarthy in California.

Asia’s nightmare scenario is a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. As all sides game-plan for a shooting war and regional allies calibrate their responses, U.S. troops are finding themselves increasingly alone.

President Biden has stated unequivocally that the U.S. will fight for Taiwan, but — unlike NATO’s role in Europe — no formal defense alliance exists to determine who fights and who stays on the sidelines.

The four regional allies that have mutual defense treaties with the U.S. and host American troops – Japan, Australia, South Korea and the Philippines — are not formally linked to one another. Moreover, China is the biggest trade partner of all four. That makes defense rhetorical coordination, let alone real-world military policies, difficult to predict.

Chinese state-controlled press routinely condemns its East Asian neighbors for allowing themselves to be “bullied” by Washington into the drive to contain Beijing in the region. The rhetoric warns the nations that they will suffer if they do not stand up to U.S. pressure.

The result: Although the Trump and Biden administrations have tried to strengthen and deepen ties with countries across the Indo-Pacific to contain China, no one in Washington or Beijing can say with full certainty what the array of forces would be in a war over Taiwan. Many fear a conflict is just a few years away.

Reluctant samurai

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SEE ALSO: Taiwan raises doubts about own defense; U.S. at center of collision course

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In any clash over Taiwan, Japan is particularly critical.

Its Ryukyu Islands encompass the Miyako Strait — a key channel for Chinese warships into the open Pacific, which they would need to reach to blockade Taiwan. Tokyo is building bases on islands that dominate the strait.

More “first to fight” U.S. assets — naval, air force and Marine — are based in Japan than anywhere else in Asia. The Japan Self-Defense Forces, or SDF, boasts powerful maritime capabilities, and the political consensus to move beyond Japan’s postwar pacifist constitution has firmed up.

“Japan probably will [fight] — as long as the Americans move to defend Taiwan,” said Grant Newsham, a retired U.S. Marine colonel and diplomat who has wide experience with Japan and Taiwan. “Japan really would have no choice.”

That decision hinges on two factors.

First, if Japan-based U.S. forces come to Taiwan’s aid in the event of a military invasion, for instance by firing artillery or missiles from the southern Ryukyus, China might return fire on Japan. Second, a Chinese takeover of Taiwan would be a strategic nightmare for defense planners in Tokyo because it would give Beijing’s fleet port access to the open Pacific and undercut Japan’s defenses.

“Taiwan’s defense is also Japan’s defense — something Japan’s ruling class finally recognizes,” Mr. Newsham said. “The SDF has been saying this for years.”

Japan and Taiwan have warm ties that date back to an unusually amicable colonial experience from 1895 to the end of World War II. Tokyo has become more bullish after tweaking its pacifist constitution in 2014 to enable “collective defense” and making a major increase in military spending. New assets — marines, F-35 light carriers and, most recently, cruise missiles — are beefing up the national armory.

“Things have come remarkably far in the past few years … especially in efforts to realign Japan’s defense strategy and policy, making public statements and moving the bureaucracy along,” said Russell Hsiao, executive director of the Global Taiwan Institute. “The question is to what extent this is at the operational planning level.”

If joint Japanese-U.S. planning is underway, it is secret. If not, “one expects Japan’s contribution to be haphazard and ad hoc — to an uncomfortable degree,” Mr. Newsham said.

Broadly, experts see U.S. forces battling Chinese forces in open combat while Japanese troops and ships protect bases and offer logistic support.

“I am sure the government is prepared to give rear-end support, but taking part in actual combat — I doubt it,” said Haruko Satoh, an international relations expert at the Osaka School of International Public Policy. Japan, she said, would not fight directly “unless our territory is threatened.”

Though war talk in Japanese media has risen, public opinion has been much more reticent aside from anti-base protests in Okinawa and the southern Ryukyus. Many see the rising alarmism and harsh rhetoric from Washington as sources of concern.

“Most Japanese are as apprehensive about the U.S. as they are about China,” Ms. Satoh said.

Australia: Committed but distant

Unlike Japan, Australia does not control strategic chokepoints or offer bases and access close to Taiwan. Still, multiple facts argue for Canberra to side with Washington in a fight over Taiwan.

The Australian-U.S. alliance was reinforced by 2021’s trilateral “AUKUS” initiative, under which Britain and the U.S. offered Australia nuclear submarine technology. Another factor is Canberra’s poor relations with Beijing.

“At the political level, [Australians] are forward-leaning and aligning with the U.S. on Taiwan,” said Mr. Hsiao. “It would be inconceivable if there was a Taiwan contingency and Australia stayed out.”

“Australia would do whatever it can to support the U.S.,” said Jeffrey Robertson, an Australian expert on Asia relations with Yonsei University in Seoul. “It has a role to play, but not a significant one.”

Alexander Neill, a Singapore-based defense specialist with the Pacific Forum, said that “perhaps the most synergistic relationship” in the region is between Australian troops and U.S. Marines, who rotate annually, while Canberra’s special forces, surface fleet and maritime patrol aircraft could prove valuable in a regionwide clash with China. Analysts also note that Australia has just 60,000 professional troops.

With the moderate administration of Prime Minister Anthony Albanese taking over from the more hawkish, anti-Chinese Scott Morrison government last year, the severity of China’s threat is once again a subject of hot political debate.

Mr. Albanese has said he is open to a visit to Beijing and has spoken repeatedly about the importance of Chinese markets for Australia’s economy.

“I think it’s been a good thing that the [Australian-Chinese] relationship has got more stable,” Mr. Albanese told the Australian Financial Review Business Summit last month. “We want a more stable, secure region. And I’ve said we will cooperate with China where we can, we’ll disagree where we must, but we’ll engage in our national interest.”

Said Mr. Neill, “Frontline capabilities have become a political football in Canberra, and there is reticence against being pulled in. It’s a hot topic, linking to Australian self-determination vis-a-vis the U.S.”

Korean priorities

In a hypothetical Taiwan war, South Korea, home to a powerful military, is ideally placed. It overlooks China across the Yellow Sea and possesses a strategically situated naval base on Jeju Island. Moreover, thousands of U.S. troops in American bases line its Yellow Sea coast.

Seoul has a minimal appetite to fight for Taiwan. “I doubt [South Korea] would be there,” said Mr. Robertson. “I don’t think they would want any role whatsoever.”

Rancor lingers in Taipei over Seoul’s abrupt severance of diplomatic ties, in favor of Beijing, in 1992. Though South Koreans are wary of China, there is little sense of democratic comradeship with Taiwan.

“There were mentions of Taiwan when Biden met [South Korean Presidents Moon Jae-in and Yoon Suk Yeol], which was quite remarkable,” said Mr. Hsiao. “But South Korea has been very hesitant to have discussions with Taiwan.”

Retired senior South Korean Gen. Chun In-bum said he never trained to defend Taiwan during his decades-long career. South Korean assistance to the U.S. in a contingency would likely be “repair facilities and hospitals on the peninsula, or refueling assets in the air or at sea,” Gen. Chun said.

Only if U.S. bases inside South Korea are hit by China would Seoul fight, Gen. Chun said. Even then, key assets would remain facing not China but North Korea. If conflict engulfs Taiwan, the fear in Seoul is that Pyongyang could leverage the chaos to attack.

“That is a serious risk,” said Gen. Chun. “It would not be easy for us to divert forces to the Taiwanese theater of operations.”

Philippines: Close but underpowered

Like Japan, the Philippines is geographically well-situated for Taiwan’s defense. Its northern island commands the Luzon Strait between the Philippines and Taiwan, a channel for Chinese fleets into the Pacific’s blue waters.

“I think the U.S. wants as much geographical access as possible, and exploiting alliance relationships is a natural consequence of that,” said Mr. Neill. “‘Bases and places’ is a key aim of Indo-Pacific Command in terms of logistics, supply and power projection, and the Philippines is very much part of that.”

In February, Manila agreed to expand rotational basing sites in the archipelago available to U.S. troops. In recent days, the government of President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has risked Beijing’s wrath by naming sites notably close to Taiwan.

The Associated Press reported Monday that the Marcos government had identified four new military camps, including two just across the sea from Taiwan. Rotating batches of U.S. forces will be allowed to be stationed there indefinitely, he said, to boost coastline defenses.

The new sites include a Philippine navy base in Santa Ana and an international airport in Lal-lo, both in northern Cagayan province — a potential staging ground for U.S. troops close to southern China and Taiwan, AP reported.

The Pentagon said in a statement that the locations “will strengthen the interoperability of the U.S. and Philippine Armed Forces and allow us to respond more seamlessly together to address a range of shared challenges in the Indo-Pacific region.”

The move infuriated Beijing, which has been engaged in a long pressure campaign with Manila over disputed sovereignty claims in the South China Sea.

The Chinese Embassy warned in a recent statement that the Marcos government’s move toward the U.S. “will drag the Philippines into the abyss of geopolitical strife and damage its economic development at the end of the day.”

The bases will be helpful, but Philippine forces less so in a war as they are underfunded and focused on counterinsurgency, not high-tech, big war. “What the defense forces of the Philippines could actually contribute is limited,” Mr. Neill said.

Read part two of this series here.