OPINION:
There is a lot we’re still learning about the Pentagon intelligence document leak, but this much we do know: The Biden administration is confronting a significant counterintelligence flap, which, as one of my CIA mentors used to say, is not like a fine wine getting better with age.
The alleged leaker may have been identified and detained, but the harm to our national security will be felt for years to come.
This is not a case where the intelligence community detected a threat to our national security and preempted it before any damage could be done. The Biden administration is squarely in what we call the incident-response “boom phase,” grappling with the horrendous fallout when a malicious insider deliberately and illegally exposes classified intelligence on the internet, apparently in an effort to impress his gamer acquaintances.
The administration must now engage in a behind-the-scenes diplomatic cleanup operation with some of our closest allies. This will invariably take a lot of the oxygen out of other priorities. At the same time, the State Department seeks to limit collateral damage and avoid a costly breakdown in vital bilateral relationships.
Having served at the CIA during the Edward Snowden and Chelsea Manning cases, I (unfortunately) have firsthand experience with the mess these leaks leave behind, the time it takes to understand and assess the damage, and the opportunity costs of having to put aside other priorities to deal with the crisis. All of that amounts to a net loss for our national security.
We had a saying in the CIA: “The secret of our success is the secret of our success.” I can only imagine how my former colleagues are muttering expletives as they try to reassure their sources and foreign colleagues that the U.S. government can safely secure their sensitive information and identities.
The agency has always embraced the highest standards and practices to protect our sources and methods. It’s more than just good tradecraft — our morals and ethics require that we do everything to protect those brave sources who obtain vital intelligence on behalf of our national security.
My former CIA boss, John Brennan, was never comfortable dealing with human intelligence, or HUMINT. He assiduously avoided the term “espionage” and, as the CIA director told NPR in a November 2015 interview: “We don’t steal secrets. We uncover. We discover. We reveal. We obtain. We solicit — all of that.”
But the CIA actually does steal secrets. That’s why the sources spying on our behalf, if they are caught in the act, face dire consequences, including, in some cases, execution.
We are dealing with myriad wickedly complex threats, all of which we should expect to become even more challenging as a result of this massive leak of classified documents.
Congressional overseers will justifiably demand full transparency into this counterintelligence debacle, as well as what policy and regulatory measures the intelligence community can adopt to prevent it from happening again. Here are three considerations as we go through the process.
First, our adversaries, especially Russia and China, are always on the hunt to recruit sources in our government. Let’s not make it easy for them by allowing such wide access that even low-level sources operating under the radar can provide the Kremlin or Beijing with valuable secrets.
Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines should direct an effort across the entire intelligence community to enforce strict compartmentation procedures so that no one with a security clearance can exploit access well beyond his or her need to know. The intelligence community should ensure its platform to detect, analyze and act on anomalous, out-of-pattern database activity is up to the task.
Second, Ms. Haines should conduct a review of intelligence agency background investigation and reinvestigation procedures of employees, especially those with a high TSSCI level of security clearance.
Third, the Department of Defense must learn the right lessons — quickly — from this leak. When I served overseas, particularly in war zones where we carried loaded weapons, my colleagues and I always made a point of checking in on officers in our chain of command to ensure there were no underlying issues that could hurt their performance on the job.
Counterintelligence training is critical. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence should ensure that all agencies have an effective employee assistance program, one that can help employees deal with life challenges so that they do not resort to poor decisions that harm themselves and their country.
Our national security relies on brave, talented and dedicated professionals willing to serve, often in harm’s way. But human beings are imperfect, and their lives are dynamic. There is no substitute for the most robust counterintelligence if we want to combat the risk of future insider threats.
• Daniel N. Hoffman is a retired clandestine services officer and former chief of station with the Central Intelligence Agency. His combined 30 years of government service included high-level overseas and domestic positions at the CIA. He has been a Fox News contributor since May 2018. Follow him on Twitter @DanielHoffmanDC.
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