OPINION:
China’s efforts to prepare for an invasion of Taiwan are accelerating, suggesting that China’s invasion should be expected after August 2023. By this time, the People’s Liberation Army will have conducted exercises to demonstrate and prepare its abilities to invade the island.
The current “Joint Sword” exercise is the second major rehearsal for an invasion of Taiwan in the past 10 months. The first was the August 2022 PLA exercise, again surrounding Taiwan. In both cases, China has used the excuse of independence forces on Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen’s meeting with the U.S. House speaker as the impetus for these provocative acts. Still, that explanation is a cover for invasion exercises.
In fact, these exercises are essential components of the Chinese Communist Party’s grand design to take Taiwan by force. What the world has witnessed are two of the three essential elements (campaigns) for the PRC’s Taiwan invasion strategy — the Joint Fire Strike Campaign and the Joint Anti-Air Raid Campaign.
In the August 2022 exercise, the PLA conducted the largest PLA air-missile-maritime exercises around Taiwan witnessed thus far. This exercise tested PLA joint force operations by employing coordinated use of space, cyber, air, army and naval forces. The main element of this “joint fire strike” rehearsal was the firing of 11 ballistic missiles surrounding Taiwan. While unprecedented, the firing of these ballistic missiles — the joint fire strike — is designed to isolate key military and political positions to minimize the ability of Taiwan to resist follow-on invasion forces.
The highlight of “Joint Sword” has been the large number of PLA combat aircraft (232) employed as part of the PLA’s “joint anti-air raid” campaign, which is designed to first establish air superiority (a temporary control of airspace) and ultimately air supremacy over Taiwan. With an unprecedented 134 PLA aircraft crossing the centerline of the Taiwan Strait during the exercise, the PLAN’s Shandong aircraft carrier operated east of Taiwan, providing air control over the eastern shore of Taiwan. Again, while an unprecedented event, it represents the second of three steps in the PLA’s Taiwan Invasion Strategy.
The next and final major element of the Taiwan Invasion Strategy is the “joint island landing” campaign. Once key targets in Taiwan are neutralized by the Joint Fire Strike Campaign and control of the air over Taiwan is achieved in the Joint Anti-Air Raid Campaign, the PLA will then be confident in their ability to launch an invasion of the island without fear of being repelled by Taiwanese ground forces or from Taiwanese or allied air forces.
Each of these campaigns is a separate and distinct element of the overall invasion strategy but is also supported and integrated with other elements like joint logistics and information dominance.
Given the timing of elections in Taiwan in early 2024, the U.S. presidential elections in the fall of 2024, weather, and other considerations, we should expect a “joint island landing” campaign rehearsal as early as August 2023. This will be the final step by the PLA for rehearsing all three of the major elements of the invasion strategy. The consequence is that after August, the PLA will have convinced Chairman Xi Jinping and the Central Military Commission that they are ready to execute the final order to launch the armed conquest of Taiwan.
At that point, all the PLA will need to do is increase the scale of each of these key campaigns for the real invasion. This should not be a problem given the greater numbers of ballistic missiles, aircraft, ships and submarines that have been tested in these two exercises to date.
Particularly since the 20th Party Congress last October, Mr. Xi has been increasingly explicit about his desire to conquer Taiwan. On March 6, he warned in a major speech that the U.S. was attempting to encircle, contain and suppress China. On March 10, China brokered the deal restoring ties between Iran and Saudi Arabia to help secure its energy supply. Midmonth, he met with Russian leader Vladimir Putin to discuss further developing their flowering entente to secure his northern and western flanks. At the Two Sessions of the PRC’s March National People’s Congress, Mr. Xi gave four speeches saying he is preparing for war.
More importantly, over the past 10 months, Mr. Xi has ordered the PLA to exercise two of three critical elements of his Taiwan Invasion Strategy — the Joint Fire Strike and Joint Anti-Air Raid Campaigns. A rehearsal of the Joint Island Landing Campaign is next, and once that is completed, most likely in the fall of 2023, an invasion of Taiwan could occur at any time.
As China is putting the big pieces in place for an invasion, the U.S. and its allies are far too passive. U.S. and allied support for Taiwan must be rushed to provide Taipei with the ability to deter an invasion and defend itself should deterrence fail. The Biden administration has made Ukraine’s defense a priority. It must make Taiwan’s defense a greater one — first, because Taiwan is a key economic, political and strategic partner, and second, because the U.S. has the chance to deter an invasion rather than fight a war with China.
Deterrence will require the deployment of more U.S. forces on and around Taiwan to provide an impact on Mr. Xi’s invasion calculus. These forces and capabilities are urgently needed.
Other longer-term developments are important as well, such as the U.S. Navy’s request to increase the production of key missile systems. This is long overdue, and it remains unclear whether the industry will be able to respond successfully in the near term. The four bases in the Philippines and the fact that the Navy aircraft carrier Ford will soon be deployable are positive steps. However, the U.S. military presence in the Western Pacific must be visibly reinforced now to provide the robust deterrent that Taiwan requires today.
• James Fanell is a government fellow at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, a retired captain in the Navy and a former director of intelligence and information operations for the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Bradley A. Thayer is director of China policy at the Center for Security Policy. He is the co-author with Lianchao Han of “Understanding the China Threat.”
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