OPINION:
Forty football seasons ago at the Naval Academy, it seems the only phrases we first-year midshipmen could use without fear of instant push-ups were “Beat Army,” and of course, “Beat Air Force.”
The Goldwater–Nichols Act of 1986 reorganized the Defense Department and “joint” became the new buzzword, dampening inter-service rivalries off the football field. A few years later the Cold War ended and a “peace dividend” forced tighter budgets, encouraging further cooperation among the services. Beyond improved operations on the battlefield and consolidated bases, joint procurement was also sought when feasible.
Enter the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter in the late 2000s. Employing stealth technology, it’s still the most lethal fighter aircraft in history. The aircraft with its F135 engine gives U.S. and allied pilots from 14 countries an advantage against any adversary.
Yet advanced weapons systems must continue to evolve in order to stay ahead of the competition.
To that end, over the past dozen years, some influential voices in Washington have called for an entirely new propulsion system to replace the F135 engine instead of making upgrades.
Such a costly plan was defeated in Congress in 2011 when a group of young, fiscally conservative Republicans joined Democrats to cut $450 million from the proposed Defense Department budget which was destined for a competitive engine as a replacement.
New propulsion system proponents have since come up with the Adaptive Engine Transition Program, AETP. A major drawback is that it’s only feasible for the Air Force F-35A used on conventional runways — not the Marine Corps F-35B for vertical, short takeoff and landing; and not the Navy F-35C used in catapult launches and arrested landings.
Though there’s also been recent talk about how AETP could be used for a sixth-generation fighter aircraft if it doesn’t work out for the F-35s, that idea defies common sense. In the history of flight since the Wright Brothers at Kitty Hawk, aerospace engineers design propulsion systems to fit airframes — not the other way around. My years as an aircraft carrier spokesman onboard USS Independence taught me that much.
Indeed, Mark Lewis, former chief scientist of the Air Force recently told Air & Space Force Magazine, “…any propulsion system has to be built and designed for the specific platform on which it’s operating. And it’s especially true for these adaptive engine systems…”
Moreover, at the Defense News Conference in Arlington, Virginia on Sept. 7, Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall warned of tough decisions that lie ahead on AETP.
“If you have several hundred F-35s in your inventory, how many more F-35s are you willing to forgo to get the new engine?” Mr. Kendall said. “It’s an expensive engine. It takes a lot just to do the development — several billion dollars. So are you prepared to have 70 less F-35s in order to have that engine in the ones that you do have?”
While it’s unrealistic today to confirm an exact number of aircraft to be sacrificed — if history is a guide the number will top 70, he’s signaling that the tradeoff between a number of aircraft versus an entirely different engine may not be worth it.
It seems a more efficient option for F-35 modernization is an upgrade rather than starting from scratch. The F135 manufacturer has proposed an Enhanced Engine Package (EEP) to improve the thrust and range of the F-35 by more than 10% percent each. This modernization would use the same supply chain, infrastructure, and sustainment network while serving all three variants.
If AETP goes ahead into production, with possibly 70 fewer Air Force F-35s in the inventory, the Navy and Marines would have to fly more aircraft into any fight to make up for the shortfall.
Besides the increased combat load, the Navy and Marine Corps shouldn’t be forced to pay for an aircraft engine they can’t use, even if indirectly.
Though Lt. Gen. Eric Fick, head of the F-35 Joint Program Office told reporters last Sept. that if the Air Force wanted the AETP, it would have to “bear the full cost”, it’s hard to say what level of horse trading on service spending goes on beyond his purview.
Will the Navy and Marines face higher installation and environmental costs on joint bases? What about personnel and readiness? Quality of life differences between the services still exist. Both USS George Washington and USS George HW Bush suffered numerous suicides in recent times during extended shipyard periods where young Sailors live-in construction zones, tragically losing seven and three respectively. The Air Force doesn’t experience such things.
Bottom line: Adopting an expensive new propulsion system for the Air Force-only F-35, and mid-program at that, is costly for all American taxpayers and seems deeply unfair to the Navy and Marine Corps.
• A retired U.S. Navy captain, Gureck most recently served as an Executive Vice President at the U.S. Naval Institute in Annapolis, Md and president, Naval Academy Class of 1986. Active duty assignments include spokesman for Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, U.S. Seventh Fleet, and USS Independence (CV 62) during the China-Taiwan crisis of 1996. The opinions expressed here are his own.
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