OPINION:
When I first arrived to work in Washington in the late 1970s, the national mood was grim. Inflation was spiking at levels not seen for decades, and interest rates were rising rapidly. The price of gas at the pump reached levels never before seen.
On the international front, the Soviet Union invaded neighboring Afghanistan for reasons which are still unclear, save for the ever-handy excuse of “historic Russian insecurity.” Preferring to use its proxies around the world during the Cold War, this was the first time in decades the Soviet Union deployed its own forces to attack another country.
Iran had been an important Middle East ally of the U.S. for many years; under the new Khomeini regime, it became an implacable enemy. Displaying little regard for American power or diplomatic niceties, Iran took American diplomats hostage, displaying American impotence for more than a year on nightly American television.
It appeared that the U.S. was losing ground all around the world. Forces opposed to American values were emboldened in Latin America, the Mideast, southern Africa and East Asia. In short, it seemed as if the tide was going out on American ascendancy.
In the face of these domestic and foreign policy challenges, the Carter administration seemed incapable of serious responses. At home, then-President Jimmy Carter urged Americans to turn down their thermostats and wear sweaters to save energy. He mandated a national speed limit of 55 miles per hour to save gas. Predictably, these half measures, to put it kindly, had no observable effect on energy prices.
Abroad, Mr. Carter prohibited U.S. athletes from participating in the 1980 Soviet-hosted Olympics. He put in place economic sanctions on American grain exports, but these ended up hurting U. S. farmers more than the Soviet Union, which simply bought its grain elsewhere. Predictably too, this did nothing to affect the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan.
If all this sounds familiar, it should. Today’s challenges are uncannily similar to those of the late 1970s. What can we learn from those earlier experiences? First, it is unlikely the president will significantly change course. Like Mr. Carter, President Joe Biden entered office with a set of goals and understandings he was committed to. Though he may modify his policies at the margins, it is highly unlikely Mr. Biden will adjust his thinking to new realities. It would, for instance, be foolish to expect Mr. Biden to embrace American energy independence.
Likewise, it would be foolish to expect a serious presidential effort to reduce inflation. As if to demonstrate that he has learned nothing — and that he will not change course — Mr. Biden is still seeking a new trillion-plus dollar spending bill. That has not changed; what has changed is his mind-boggling claim that massive new spending will reduce the deficit and lower inflation.
It would be equally foolish to expect Mr. Biden to change his long-held views on foreign policy. His administration is still committed to an Iran nuclear deal, though why other than sheer stubbornness is hard to say. At this late date, no deal will slow Iran’s movement toward nuclear weapons; it will only provide Iran with billions of dollars to extend its state-sponsored terror. Even at this moment in the negotiations, the Iranians have lobbed missiles into facilities in Iraq friendly to the U.S.
Though Mr. Biden has put in place meaningful economic sanctions against Russia, in several instances, it has been only at the demand of Congress or — more surprisingly — our European NATO allies. These sanctions have made no appreciable difference in slowing Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine. Mr. Biden is likely to remain always a step behind Russian President Vladimir Putin, who seems to be crafting the ground rules for what the U.S. can and cannot do at every step of the way.
What is to be done? The depressing news is that we will have to await a new and very different president to see tough, sensible presidential actions. In the meantime, we will have to rely on Congress — always an iffy proposition — to prevent the worst possible outcomes. The good news is that Congress has in the past occasionally risen to this role. In the late 1970s, Congress increased the defense budget over Mr. Carter’s objections, prevented the president from withdrawing U.S. troops from South Korea and vastly strengthened the Taiwan Relations Act to cement American ties with Taiwan.
Congress can play that role again. The Senate has already prevented the obvious mistake of enacting a vast new social spending bill. Congress has already successfully pressed the president to strengthen sanctions against Russia. There is plenty more it could do. In that regard, the 2022 midterm congressional elections cannot come too soon.
• Jeff Bergner was formerly staff director of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and assistant secretary of state.
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