OPINION:
What lessons is the acquisitive and aggressive communist regime in China taking from the war in Ukraine and our response to the equally acquisitive and aggressive Russians?
Despite the very solid initial start and an important and successful effort to keep the alliance pointed in the right direction, the weaknesses and limits of both the Biden administration and the European Union have been exposed in Ukraine.
The unfortunate reality is that Team Biden has failed to do everything it can. It has yet to impose secondary sanctions on those who do business with Russia, and the sanctions it has imposed are laden with exemptions and loopholes. The administration was slow to ban Russian crude oil and is now on the wrong side of the proposed donation of Polish MiGs. It has yet to provide long-range surface-to-air missiles.
The EU also has performed below expectations in Ukraine. Despite the talking heads blathering about the reinvigoration of NATO, the hard truth is that it has not given much in the way of actual military-grade assistance, and many (especially Germany) seem more concerned about keeping Russian energy flowing than preventing Ukrainian blood from flowing.
The EU even managed to choose last week as the right time to sanction Poland and Hungary for trespasses against European social orthodoxy, despite the fact that, at the moment, Poland is doing more for the Ukrainians than anyone else.
If Ukraine loses, there will be questions about whether Team Biden and the EU did everything they could to prevent that outcome. It will be especially pointed if a defeat of Ukraine is accompanied by widespread killing of those supportive of the regime.
China is, of course, watching all of this. In any sort of conflict over Taiwan — or the Philippines for that matter — it will be important that China is much more embedded in the economies of western nations than is Russia. In the current conflict, we will ban, but not sanction, Russian oil and natural gas. The Europeans won’t do either. There is just too much economic pain.
Now think about how much more pain there would be in banning or sanctioning Chinese products. We can barely tolerate the current disruptions to supply chains.
We have identified communist China as a genocidal regime, yet we continue to trade with them as if they are a normal regime with respect for international norms. Why would an invasion of Taiwan change any of that?
The EU has limited interest in the Pacific. Consequently, it seems unlikely that the governments or their populations will be as concerned about an incursion into Taiwan. Kyiv is just 800 miles from Berlin, yet the EU’s response to the invasion has been very modulated. How much more attenuated by distance and personal interests will the Europeans be in the event of a conflict between China and Taiwan?
The big lesson from the war in Ukraine is that the United States will not do anything provocative — no matter what the justification — to a nuclear power. Think about a potential conflict across the Straits of Formosa through that lens. The Russians are clearly targeting civilians and are engaged in other war crimes, and we won’t even arrange for the delivery of a couple of dozen aging fighter jets and a few long-range missiles.
If you are Taiwan, you probably want to get your anti-ship and anti-aircraft systems and weaponry in order now. It seems unwise to anticipate any help once the shooting starts. Press for the United States and others to recognize you as a nation now. It won’t help much, but it will give you some rights and the ability to plead your case in the international arena.
Above all, be realistic — as we all should be realistic — about the fortitude of the current administration and the limits of its willingness to help.
• Michael McKenna, a columnist for The Washington Times, is the co-host of “The Unregulated” podcast. He was most recently a deputy assistant to the president and deputy director of the Office of Legislative Affairs at the White House.
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