OPINION:
During his 10 years of authoritarian rule in North Korea, its leader, Kim Jong-un, failed to accomplish his two primary objectives: normalization of relations with the U.S. and acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear weapons state.
When Mr. Kim took over from his father, Kim Jong-il, who died of a reported heart attack in December 2011, there was hope that this young leader, who had studied in Switzerland, would pursue a policy of economic reform and political opening up to the outside world. To succeed, North Korea would be willing to commit to complete and verifiable denuclearization in return for security assurances and eventual normal relations with the U.S., which would provide the North with international legitimacy and access to financial institutions for economic development purposes.
Over the past 10 years, we have seen a leader determined to normalize relations with the U.S., and with confidence that he can convince the U.S. to accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state. This determination to retain nuclear weapons while seeking normal relations with the U.S. has been the consistent strategy of North Korea for the past 28 years.
Dating back to Mr. Kim’s grandfather, Kim Il-sung, who approved the 1994 Agreed Framework that halted North Korea’s nuclear program at Yongbyon in return for two proliferation-resistant nuclear power reactors and a path to normal relations with the U.S. This agreement ended abruptly in 2002 when North Korea was confronted with U.S. information that it was pursuing a clandestine Highly Enriched Uranium for nuclear weapons.
Mr. Kim’s father, Kim Jong-il, approved the September 2005 joint statement of the Six Party Talks that committed North Korea to complete and verifiable dismantlement of all nuclear weapons and facilities, in return for security assurances, economic development assistance and a path to normal relations with the U.S. This agreement also ended abruptly in 2009, when North Korea would not permit international monitors to leave the Yongbyon nuclear facility to visit other undeclared suspect nuclear facilities.
And in June 2018, Mr. Kim, in a historic Singapore Summit with former President Donald Trump, agreed to the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in return for a transformation of relations with the U.S. and a peace treaty to end the Korean War. This agreement also ended abruptly in February 2019 during the Hanoi Summit with Mr. Trump when Mr. Kim would agree to halt nuclear activities only at the Yongbyon nuclear facility and not at other nuclear facilities in the North, as requested by Mr. Trump.
What’s constant from these years of negotiations and temporary successes, was North Korea’s determination to have and retain nuclear weapons, regardless of any agreement. What was also constant was the North’s determination to normalize relations with the U.S.
During Mr. Kim’s 10 years in power, he has raced to become a formidable nuclear weapons state, launching over 120 missiles, including two intercontinental missiles, the Hwasong 14 and 15, and conducting four nuclear tests, to include a thermonuclear test in 2017. The North has a reported nuclear arsenal of 30 to 60 nuclear weapons that can be mated to ballistic missiles. So, if you’re living in South Korea or Japan or anywhere else in Northeast Asia, North Korea is an existential nuclear threat. Eventually, it could be an existential nuclear threat to the U.S.
Getting North Korea to denuclearize will continue to be a challenge, especially given the nuclear and missile progress Mr. Kim has made with these programs during the last 10 years. But living with a nuclear North Korea will be an enduring nightmare for South Korea, Japan, the region and beyond. One should never disregard the potential for the accidental use of nuclear weapons due to miscommunication or misjudgment. Moreover, a nuclear arms race in the region, with allies like South Korea and Japan pursuing their own nuclear weapons, despite U.S. extended deterrence commitments, is a real likelihood. An even more disquieting reality will be the potential for nuclear terrorism, with a nuclear weapon or fissile material for a dirty bomb getting into the hands of a rogue state or terrorist organization.
Mr. Kim made it clear during the 8th Congress of the Workers Party in January 2021 that the state must do a much better job caring for the people and improving the dire economic situation in the North. Prior to COVID-19 and the North’s self-imposed isolation, a United Nations and North Korea joint study reported that over 40% of the population in the North was malnourished. One can only imagine what it is now.
While focusing on the economic challenges, Mr. Kim also recently announced that North Korea will also develop “ultramodern tactical nuclear weapons, hypersonic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and cruise missiles.” And given what we’ve seen over the past 10 years, it’s likely North Korea will be partially if not fully successful with these pursuits.
So, even if we don’t see another ICBM launch or another nuclear test, North Korea appears determined to build more nuclear weapons and more sophisticated missiles to deliver these nuclear weapons.
Currently, North Korea’s lifeline continues to be China. If China implemented all the United Nations sanctions imposed after 2016, as it did in 2017, it would be hard for North Korea to survive economically. It appears, however, that China is now providing some of the energy and food aid necessary to keep the North afloat.
Hopefully, Mr. Kim now understands that he can’t have normal relations with the U.S. and acceptance as a nuclear weapons state. And if Mr. Kim is concerned with the plight of North Korea’s economy and its devastating impact on its people, he’ll come back to negotiations to get sanctions lifted. Moreover, he should finally realize that North Korea will never be accepted as a nuclear weapons state, thus requiring him to decide if normal relations with the U.S. and a path to economic well-being and international legitimacy are more important than nuclear weapons and missiles to deliver them.
Suppose Mr. Kim decides that nuclear weapons are more important. In that case, the U.S. and allies and strategic partners have no alternative but to enhance containment, with additional sanctions, and increase deterrence efforts to counter the nuclear and conventional threat from North Korea.
Ideally, Mr. Kim will return to negotiations for the complete and verifiable denuclearization of North Korea, in return for security assurances, sanctions relief and a path to normal relations with the U.S.
• Joseph R. DeTrani was the former special envoy for negotiations with North Korea from 2003 to 2006 and the former director of the National Counterproliferation Center. The views expressed are the author’s and do not imply endorsement of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence or any other U.S. government agency.
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