OPINION:
We would all like to move on from Afghanistan, but it is just not going to happen. There are perverse unintended consequences still likely to surface from our decisions that we will not be able to avoid or deny. Stockpile management and humanitarian interests are just two examples of where further U.S. involvement will be needed.
Sometime around 2013, the U.S. military recognized the need to reduce its ammunition holdings in Afghanistan. The troop surge was ending, and we were sitting on massive amounts of ammunition. Ammunition is heavy to transport, and the sheer volume would stress air assets needed for other priorities, so the decision was made to ship out only what could not be destroyed or given away to the Afghans.
The Afghans were only too happy to accept what we offered because ammunition for a country chronically at war is something to be hoarded. In Afghanistan, bullets are a type of currency. They are something you never throw out, regardless of age or condition. As a result, Afghan depots were soon at maximum capacity and then some.
Afghan National Army (ANA) depots are still jammed with an estimated 4-6 thousand metric tons stored primarily in eight sites scattered across the country. Imagine several thousand neatly stacked one-ton piles of ammunition carrying the overall equivalent explosive force of a 5-kiloton tactical nuclear weapon; that pretty much sums up what is in the Afghan depots today. Precise inventories are difficult to establish because of resource constraints and an overall deteriorating security situation, but by any measure, the Afghans have a substantial amount of ammunition.
There are also legacy munitions from the Soviet-era stored here and there and many unofficial, clandestine closets packed with confiscated Taliban material, including improvised explosives and weapons of all kinds. Their inventory also includes man-portable air defense systems provided by the U.S. to Mujahideen fighters during the Soviet invasion. While the expiration date on these items has passed, some are still likely to be serviceable. They continue to pose a threat to aviation, as it only takes one well-placed shot to have an impact. This recent YouTube video shows the Taliban already have confiscated some of these items from the ANA.
For years the United States had DoD and State Department representatives work with the ANA on ‘physical security and stockpile management,’ the technical term for keeping ammunition storage areas safe and secure. Managing inventories and conducting inspections with U.S. oversight slowed in recent years as stockpile management dropped as a priority and COVID-19 drained any remaining strength to manage an effective program.
The deteriorating national security situation in Afghanistan has exposed these sites to potential Taliban targeting or looting by warlords concerned about the aftermath of a failed national government. Either way, if these sites are breached, a flood of ammunition will fall out of government control. In all likelihood, some of this ammunition would end up in terrorist or criminal networks. Imagine the irony if U.S. ammunition from Afghanistan brought in to support the 20-year war on terror is used in a terrorist attack in Africa, Europe, and even the United States.
The vulnerability of these sites could be revealed in a matter of months or even weeks. Most of these storage depots are dispersed, well outside the boundaries of the major cities and away from the already challenged ANA rapid-response forces. The Taliban and Afghan warlords know exactly where these facilities are located. Due to the varied locations of these depots, their sheer size, and the Afghan obsession with hoarding ammunition, there is no automatic destruction plan, and sending in a few cruise missiles will not eliminate this perverse unintended consequence.
Ongoing humanitarian assistance, and intervention, will also be needed from the U.S.
The Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement in the State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA) is one of many U.S. government offices that promote our interests through the administration of foreign assistance programs. They deliver programs and services to reduce the harmful effects of at-risk conventional weapons of war and unexploded ordnance, especially on vulnerable civilian populations.
A variety of companies and NGOs implement these programs around the world on our behalf. PM/WRA has provided more than $4 billion in U.S. taxpayer assistance to over 100 countries since 1993 through contracts with these organizations.
In Afghanistan, PM/WRA has supported successful demining, clearance of unexploded ordnance in civilian areas, and humanitarian projects across for many years. It recently offered a baffling Notice of Funding Opportunity (NOFO) for a 2-year project valued at $7.9 million to clear hazards from unexploded ordnance in the Zhari District of Kandahar Province. PM/WRA is currently reviewing proposal submissions to select an implementing partner to fulfill this NOFO, but the logic for this program is incomprehensible. Zhari is under Taliban control. It is a combination of criminals and warlords. Zhari is where Mullah Omar organized the Taliban in the old days and, along with neighboring Panjwayi District, is their spiritual home.
An outrageous unintended consequence from this humanitarian clearance project could emerge from the recruitment of local workers. In a program like Zhari, several hundred workers would be hired at a good salary by Afghan standards to fulfill the contract. There is significant coordination between the implementing partner, the district governor, and the tribal elders in this process. Traditionally, efforts were made to keep the tribal elders happy. They were generally permitted to select the workers since it meant less violence and fewer labor issues at the worksite. This type of program is not standard practice for the State Department to mandate the workers be vetted, but this is not a standard project. It is in the cradle of the Taliban, under their control, with their leaders bestowing patronage jobs with funds provided by the United States.
Without question, workers hired for the Zhari project will have been involved in combat operations that likely killed or wounded U.S. or ISAF soldiers. The incongruity of this project to U.S. national interests and our commitment to those who sacrificed-US, ISAF, and Afghan-cannot be overstated. How could this project be explained to a Gold Star family member or someone wounded in Kandahar?
Adding to the surreal nature of this endeavor, the State Department on July 28th issued a Level-4 Travel Advisory for Americans to avoid travel to or depart from Afghanistan as soon as possible due to “COVID-19, crime, terrorism, civil unrest, kidnapping, and armed conflict.” All the while, PM/WRA wants to invest in a 2-year project for the spiritual homeland of the movement causing the disorder. How does something like this pass institutional review?
These situations are neither destiny nor fate. They illustrate the perverse unintended consequences of our decisions. What’s the old Maya Angelou adage: “Do the best you can until you know better. Then when you know better, do better.” We know better. We should do better.
• Ron MacCammon is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces Colonel. He was assigned to the U.S. embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, to oversee and coordinate PM/WRA programs. He has a Doctorate in Education from the University of South Florida and taught International Relations at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point.
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