OPINION:
History usually doesn’t repeat itself, but it has patterns that can be useful if viewed objectively. As the United States and China square off over sea control in the Indo-Pacific region, there are some interesting parallels between this era and the run-up to Pearl Harbor.
That history should provide cautionary food for thought for both Chinese and American strategic planners, but the assumptions the Chinese appear to be operating under could be particularly problematical if a war does occur.
Before 1941, Japanese naval war plans were predicated on luring the American Pacific Fleet into a decisive battleship brawl in the Western Pacific which they believed — not without some justification — that they could win. Many American admirals also believed in a decisive surface fleet engagement, and both sides thought any war would be short.
By 1941 Adm. Yamamoto, the commander of the Japanese Combined Fleet, had reached the conclusion that the western battle assumption would be disastrous if it proved to be invalid. His thinking was that, if the American chose to lure the Japanese fleet into the Central Pacific around Hawaii, their build-up of carrier and land-based aircraft would largely negate superior Japanese seamanship and gunnery.
In addition, Yamamoto further calculated that early in the war the Japanese main battle fleet lacked the fuel to maneuver effectively across the Pacific. He hoped that his Pearl Harbor plan of using a manageable number of aircraft carriers to deliver a crippling blow would buy the Japanese time to build up the resources to fight the long war that he believed was inevitable based on his extensive knowledge of the United States.
Although Yamamoto sold the Pearl Harbor plan to the high command, most senior Japanese leaders persisted in the short war theory believing that Americans had no stomach for a protracted conflict.
Chinese planners also appear to have adopted a short war approach. Having constructed an “anti-navy” complex for anti-access/access denial, the Chinese hope to use that defensive strategic umbrella to achieve offensive operational and tactical goals in the region without significant interference from the United States and its strategic allies. This would present the Americans with a fait accompli that could be solidified through peace negotiations within the context of a short, victorious war.
As with World War II in the Pacific, the operable Chinese planning words are, “short war.” The myth that Americans will not tolerate long war continues to persist despite World War II, Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan where Americans fought for years. The United States finally left Vietnam after over a decade of fighting when the general American consensus became that it was not worth the effort. Cherry picking Vietnam as a precedent for building a Chinese military strategy is a bad bet.
Many historians have concluded that the Japanese did the Americans a favor by destroying the U.S. battleship line at Pearl Harbor. That event forced the Americans to rely on the remaining U.S. carriers. After victory at Midway, the U.S. Navy adopted the carrier as its main striking arm and never looked back.
Today, the Chinese appear to believe that sinking the American carriers in and around the Indo-Pacific and disabling the U.S. airbases in the region will convince us to sue for peace so they can gobble up Taiwan and coerce other regional actors to cede them basing rights and regional hegemony. It is a great plan if it works.
If the Chinese act on these assumptions and attack tomorrow, the United States would likely lose one or more carriers and see its airpower in the region temporarily neutralized. If the Americans cave, the Chinese win. But what if the assumption fails and the Americans dig in for the long haul?
If the Americans decide to continue the fight, they will likely build fleets of robotic ships, aircraft and ground vehicles that will augment their manned systems. China would then have done to the aircraft carrier what the Japanese did to the battleship in 1941. Robotics would make a naval war of attrition much more palatable for the United States and add to China’s problems.
Bad wars are usually based on bad assumptions. The best thing that the United States can do for the Chinese people is to convince Beijing that it would face a long naval war that it cannot win. If Beijing miscalculates regarding our will as the Japanese did in the run-up to Pearl Harbor, everyone will lose. The Navy can build the capability; the politicians need to show the will.
• Gary Anderson retired as chief of staff of the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab. He lectures on Wargaming and Red Teaming at the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs.
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