OPINION:
Readers of a certain age will remember the events leading up to the shooting of four Kent State University students in 1970 by the Ohio National Guardsmen during an anti-Vietnam War protest that turned ugly. The Ohio Guard soldiers were not trained for the type of violent confrontation that they encountered, and some panicked, firing without orders leading to a general loss of command and control.
President Trump has threatened to use troops — particularly the Guard — in places like Chicago and Portland if local authorities continue to fail in controlling their cities.
If that happens, National Guardsmen should be trained to properly deal with extreme urban disturbances because the Antifa elements of the current protests are becoming much better organized and violent than what the Guard ran into at Kent State. Perhaps it is time for the National Guard to learn from the Marine Corps concept of the “Three Block War.”
During their urban warfare experiments in the 1990s, the Marines realized that any city is a collection of villages; and that situations can differ greatly from one block to another. Soldiers and Marines must be prepared to rapidly transition from presence patrolling in one block, to humanitarian aid in another, to potential combat situations in a third.
The kind of mental preparation to quickly make those transitions seamlessly requires intense training. That experimentation led to training methods that became invaluable in battling urban insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan. Such training can be modified to deal with domestic urban disturbances.
Portland is a good example. Most protesters are non-violent and want to avoid confrontation, but a small group has been moving toward urban insurgency. One former Navy Seal among the Antifa faction has been crafting improvised explosive devices while others have rigged booby traps that harken back to the war in Vietnam.
Some law enforcement officers have now suffered permanent eye injuries from hand-held laser pointers. Such individuals are deliberately trying to incite a Kent State-style overreaction by law enforcement and will certainly up the ante if the Guard becomes involved.
The essence of the Three Block War is to keep violent situations localized before they become strategic events such as occurred at Kent State. The Marine Corps developed the concept of the “Strategic Corporal.”
This means that squad leaders have to understand that snap decisions that they may make in a chaotic situation can become world news in this age of social media where nearly every citizen with a smart phone can reach a national audience instantaneously.
That kind of training is not something that most National Guard troops currently undergo routinely. The Guard Bureau should partner with the Marine Corps and develop training programs to prepare their troops for domestic urban employment.
So far, the most violent domestic urban confrontations fall far short of the battles in places like Fallujah and Ramadi. Consequently, proper preparation of any units — police or military — that react to violent urban demonstrations should be geared to containing that violence short of lethal force if possible or to keep it to a bare minimum should lethality occur.
Putting armed soldiers in a policing role is never a desired first option, but the failure of some city leaders in places such as Portland, Seattle and Chicago to support their police — and actually undermine them in some cases — has resulted in diminished efficiency and subsequent understaffing. That may well require National Guard or other military intervention in extreme situations.
The Three Block War is a small unit affair that starts with individual training. Each soldier must be intimately aware of the rules of engagement and drilled on various scenarios where they may be applied. These rules may change frequently, so training must be continuous.
Platoon commanders and squad leaders must be prepared to deal with the public in the full expectation that their reactions to extreme provocation could go globally viral in an instant. Troops must be thoroughly familiar with the uses and potential misuses of non-lethal weapons that they may be issued.
In other words, the Strategic Corporal must also be a strategic public affairs officer. Units should be put through exercises with role players simulating both the violent tactics of sophisticated agitators and applying methods of de-escalating tense situations before they turn violent. Soldiers also need to simulate the provision of assistance to innocent victims caught in violent situations.
Very few National Guard personnel or regular soldiers want to get involved in domestic urban violence, but failure to prepare for those eventualities risks the possibility of disaster.
• Gary Anderson retired as the chief of staff of the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab and was involved in the development of Marine Corps urban doctrine.
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