- Monday, January 21, 2019

It’s seldom that the president makes a key decision against the advice of the national security establishment, which is what President Trump did in deciding to remove 2,000 U.S. troops from northern Syria. Many in the media as well as some of his strongest supporters in Congress have questioned this decision, but it is worth considering this decision and what the actual consequences are.

The United States has had only limited involvement in the eight years of civil war in Syria. U.S. forces were introduced only for the purpose of eliminating ISIS — a mission that has largely been accomplished. While the United States was a significant factor in removing ISIS from Syria, much of this was accomplished by Russia that largely destroyed the ISIS-held city of Raqqa, operating under different rules of engagement and a far different view of collateral damage. Russian air strikes destroyed much of ISIS, along with a large part of the city and its civilian population. Also important in the defeat of ISIS have been Kurdish forces and the Syrian army which remain to counter ISIS.

U.S. troops do not need to remain in Syria, to either finish the job of eliminating ISIS or preventing its re-emergence. ISIS in Syria is not a national security threat to the United States but is a serious concern to Syria. Now that the civil war is largely over, the Syrians along with the Russians and the Kurds can easily finish the job. What has been holding them up for several months has been a cease-fire arranged by Russia and Turkey in an effort to avoid a bloodbath in northern Syria around Idlib — the only part of Syria not yet returned to Syrian government control.

The recent and tragic deaths of four U.S. troops in Syria is no reason to keep forces there. Their deaths were the result of a single terrorist bomber in a restaurant frequented by U.S. troops — not unlike similar terrorist bombings in Israel, France, Britain and elsewhere in restaurants and public places. Decades of experience with such terrorist events dictate that the “answer” to this type of attack is not keeping 2,000 troops around. This is an intelligence and counter-terrorism problem and not a military operation. Standing armies don’t capture terrorist cells and suicide bombers. It also goes without saying that U.S. troops should avoid frequenting the same restaurants which are certainly known to ISIS and are sitting ducks for a suicide bomber.

Apart from the counter-ISIS mission, another argument for keeping U.S. forces in Syria is to protect allied Kurdish fighters from Turkey that sees them as terrorists and a threat to Turkey. Here Mr. Trump, as well as National Security Adviser John Bolton and others have made it clear to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan that entering Syria and attacking the Kurds is just not acceptable and have received assurances that this will not happen. Whether or not Mr. Erdogan can be trusted remains an open question, but Mr. Trump has made it clear that there would be severe consequences for violating this explicit agreement.

Ultimately, the Kurds need to come to an agreement with the Syrian government over some area or “safe zone” in northern Syria where they can live in peace. Here there appears to be some progress on this front. Exactly what language is used to solve the problem and the size of the federated zone is still an open question, but the important point is that this is being worked out by the Kurds and the Syrians with assistance from Russia. What the United States needs to do here, apart from continued pressure on Mr. Erdogan, is enter this dialogue and engage in serious “back channel” discussions with the Syrians and Russia to help fashion a long-lasting territorial and diplomatic solution for the Kurds.

The other major concern in Syria is the continued Iranian involvement and weapons that pose a major threat to Israel. Iranian missiles in Syria that threaten Israel will not be tolerated, and Israel has repeatedly bombed Iranian weapons depots within Syria making clear their intention to continue such strikes. At one-point last year, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu believed that Russia could force Iran out of Syria only to find out that Russian President Vladimir Putin could not make this happen. Despite some setbacks, Israeli-Russian relations and interactions with respect to Syria have been positive. Mr. Netanyahu and Mr. Putin have met and talked repeatedly while their military leaders conduct discussions over ongoing operations and have established procedures to deconflict their activities.

This is another critical area where the United States and Russia do not have adverse interests and should be working more closely together. A continued Iranian presence in Syria is adverse to the interests of both nations, as well as Israel, Saudi Arabia and others. What is called for now are high-level “back channel” discussions with Russia on a strategy that meets the strategic interests of all parties and can be achieved. This needs to be done at a level below any public Trump-Putin summit and continued on an ongoing basis.

One model may be the negotiations that took place after the 1973 Middle East War conducted by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, leading to the 1974 disengagement agreement between Israel and Syria and had the support of all parties, including the Soviet Union, that resulted in 40 years of peace in the area. Now both Israel and Syria are looking to restore this historic framework and it would be useful to consider how it was achieved at a most difficult time,

• Abraham Wagner served in senior national security positions.

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