OPINION:
Guessing whether or not DPRK’s supreme leader Kim Jong-un will yield to President Trump’s demands and agree to dismantle his country’s nuclear and missile programs reached the peak on the eve of the second U.S.-North Korea summit in Hanoi.
The U.S intelligence community holds the pessimistic view, which is widely shared by most Western pundits. Yet, we remain hopeful because Kim Jong-un is a very different leader from his predecessors and his track record imbues us with guarded optimism.
Mr. Kim knows well the criticisms and negative perceptions of North Korea around the world. He is able to see objectively his country’s position on the international arena, that is, as a relatively backward, isolated, and unpredictable “rogue state” facing growing economic hardships and political uncertainty. He knows the West believes he is a liar and cheater, and Western leaders don’t trust his government and find it politically difficult, imprudent, and pointless to negotiate with it. While he can’t criticize his predecessors for the state of affairs he inherited from them, he always asks whether any foreign leader has ever seriously negotiated with him. Then, he wonders why they believe that he is just like his father, Kim Jong-il, and grandfather, Kim Il-sung, which is really a subjective assumption, not a fact.
It is a no secret that Mr. Kim sees himself as the ruler of North Korea for the next several decades. Despite government propaganda, he understands that it will be extremely difficult for him to sustain his rule in the long run due tightening international sanctions, and, therefore, he has to choose between reliance on nuclear weapons or international cooperation to preserve his regime.
Mr. Kim frequently tells his interlocutors he wants to normalize relations with the United States “fast, fast.” He devotes considerable time to personally managing the DPRK-U.S. relations. Mr. Kim wants to settle the nuclear issue before Mr. Trump leaves office, while recognizing the implementation of the nuclear deal might take time. He understands this year is critical, and if no progress is made in DPRK-U.S. relations in 2019, it will be more difficult to achieve a breakthrough and normalize relations in the year of presidential election campaigns in the U.S. and South Korea in 2020.
Although neither side is sure what the opposite side really wants, they have already expressed how much they are willing to give in. What is left is how to assemble all pieces of the “denuclearization/normalization puzzle” together and in what sequence. Since Pyongyang, Washington and Seoul recognize time is on no one’s side, they apparently share the belief in the practical utility of the “quick action for quick action” approach.
Two critical challenges still face negotiators: Trust and value. On the trust side, Mr. Kim stresses the major discrepancy between the Untied States and North Korea’s negotiating positions: All his steps, including the dismantlement of Yonbyon nuclear center and other critical components of DPRK’s nuclear program, will be irreversible, whereas all U.S. steps (e.g., sanctions relief, suspension of military exercises, exchange of liaison offices, economic assistance, etc.) will be reversible.
A credible solution to the irreversibility problem undermining mutual trust must be found before any final deal is reached. On the value side, despite common perceptions, some U.S. offers (e.g., opening a liaison office or signing the End of Korean War declaration) don’t look appealing to Mr. Kim at all because he sees them as either purely symbolic without enhancing the security of his regime or benefitting Washington more than Pyongyang, and, therefore, he doesn’t want to give up anything of value to obtain them.
The United States needs to put more credible security assurances and economic benefits on the table to entice Mr. Kim to strike a deal. In turn, to make the deal more palatable for Mr. Trump, Mr. Kim appears to be willing to acquiesce to the “Yonbyon Plus” formula which will incorporate some “hidden card” — a positive surprise for the United States — that he is likely to bring to the negotiating table in Hanoi.
Mr. Kim comes across as a rational individual, calculating his steps on the basis of the cost-benefit analysis, a strategist prioritizing regime preservation and national survival; yet, he appears to be very emotional and never satisfied unless things get done fast.
Kim Jong-un committed himself — at least verbally — to denuclearization: He told so in person to President Trump and Secretary Mike Pompeo, repeatedly to Chinese President Xi and South Korean President Moon. Does he mean it? Only future will tell. Does Mr. Kim himself know what he wants? Probably, not yet, because he is evolving: Just like any other 36-year-old person, he may be certain today, but he may change his mind tomorrow.
The best advice for our leaders in dealing with Mr. Kim is “distrust, Gorbify, and verify.” They need to maximize engagement and embrace Kim Jong-un, win his heart and mind, shape his “new thinking,” limiting the influence of his hardline aides, holding his hand firmly and wisely guiding his actions toward a prosperous and secure future for the Korean people in a safer world. The alternative is bleak: Failure in Hanoi might prompt Mr. Kim to return to his shell, lock down his country, and resume belligerent behavior, while waiting until the next U.S. administration to come: Escalating tensions on the Korean peninsula will be deja vu all over again.
• Alexandre Y. Mansourov is professor of security studies at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and professor of Asian studies at the School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University.
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