The war game that never happened

OPINION:

Time magazine claims that a 2017 war game to examine military options regarding North Korea sponsored by Vice President Mike Pence and former National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster was scuttled when former Secretary of Defense James Mattis refused to allow military personnel to participate; not having the military in a game involving military options would have invalidated its credibility. In retrospect, Mr. Mattis made a mistake.

According to Time reporter Peter Bergen, Mr. Mattis believed that at “any moment the president would do something irrational, so he had to be the force of reason.” In other words, the game might have presented Mr. Trump with a dangerous military option which he might seize on. Mr. Mattis is one of the great heroes and military minds of recent American history, but in this case, he made a bad call on two counts. First, Mr. Trump has resisted truly aggressive adventurous military options throughout his presidency. Second, failing to lay out all viable options for a commander is a failure of responsibility in any staff officer — particularly as one as experienced as Mr. Mattis.

There are some common misconceptions regarding war games. Perhaps the most insidious is that they are predictive; that is not their purpose. A good war game will examine the options open to a decision maker and analyze the issues that might occur with the adoption of each option. In other words, the potential advantages and disadvantages of each option would be studied in detail. War games are merely a tool for helping commanders make informed decisions. They are not a panacea.

What Mr. Pence and Mr. McMaster had in mind was not a high-tech computer driven tactical game, but a strategic role-playing seminar game with experts representing the North Korea (Red) and probably other players replicating the interests of other parties such as Japan, South Korea, Russia and China. In gaming parlance, these third parties are usually referred to as Green. Green’s support or lack thereof for various U.S. (Blue) options is almost as important as the Red reaction.

Modern wargaming was a 19th-century German invention, and that has given it something of a mixed reputation since the Germans lost both world wars. The weakness in German wargaming was that it was used essentially at the tactical and operational levels. As such, it did not take into account the strategic reaction of neutral nations which might become friends or enemies. Consequently, the reactions of the French and British — and later the Americans — to Germany’s blatant violation of Belgian neutrality in 1914. During World War II, Hitler repeatedly ignored military advice based on wargaming, relying instead on his gut instincts which had proved right early in the war but disastrous later.

According to Time, Mr. Mattis feared that Mr. Trump would pick the wrong option despite arguments against it based on the gaming. The difference between the decision-making of Mr. Trump and Hitler is that — while Hitler usually picked the most daring choices possible — the president has usually erred on the side of less aggressive military options; or of deferring action entirely. Hitler at least had all the options presented to him. In this case, Mr. Trump was not presented with a full range of possibilities.

Once the options have been gamed and the game analyzed, the advantages and disadvantages of each option are presented to the decision-maker. Not all of these are equal. For example: “Red would likely retaliate with nuclear weapons” would far outweigh “Red might retaliate economically.” However, how much value the decision-maker puts on each assumes he is a rational actor. Mr. Trump may not be a voracious reader, but he is capable of examining options if they are clearly laid out. Making the presentation clear is the staff officer’s job. Withholding information or presenting one option as the only logical choice are the worst things a staff can do.

It’s possible that Mr. Mattis did not like the way the game was designed or thought that the Red and Green Teams did not represent the thinking of the actors they were replicating. If that was the case, he would have done better to suggest to Mr. McMaster and the vice president that the professionals at the National or Naval War Colleges design and run the game.

Mr. Pence and Mr. McMaster were correct in wanting a game to examine North Korean scenarios. Would the president have been better prepared for his ill-fated negotiations with Kim Jong-un if it had happened? We will never know.

• Gary Anderson lectures in Alternative Analysis (Red Teaming) at the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs.