OPINION:
Seventy years ago this month, Gen. Douglas MacArthur began his first full month of residence in Tokyo. There for the next six years he would direct the transformation of Japan, to wit: its demobilization, restoration of its economy and institution of a liberal constitution that would mimic the governance of advanced democratic nations. The irony of this largely nonmilitary role for MacArthur was that just a year earlier in October 1944, he was instrumental in the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the biggest naval encounter in history that eventually led to the demise of Japan’s ability to continue its attacks on the high seas during World War II.
More than 700 American vessels fighting over 100,000 square miles of ocean were involved, including combat ships, amphibious vessels and patrol and service transporters. The battle was a culmination of a 30-month ordeal after the Japanese captured the Philippines in May 1942, necessitating that Americans engage in a long trek to take over islands critical to Japan’s oil supplies and insulation from air attacks on its homeland.
Although the Japanese after the fall of the Philippines had three times the number of ships, the United States had the decided edge in deploying aircraft, as illustrated by the Battle of Coral Sea in May 1942, which blocked a Japanese threat to Australia. The encounter set a first in naval history in that opposing ships never came within sight of each other, fought entirely by aircraft. The defense of an American naval base at Midway Island a month later saw a victory sustained by warplanes once again. But taking an offensive strategy against Japanese-held islands would be the litmus test of America’s war plan.
To be sure, invasion of the Philippines in October 1944 was not a unanimous military decision. For Gen. MacArthur, who barely escaped the Japanese takeover in a Navy PT boat with his family and promised, “I shall return,” it was the only option. When he and Adm. Chester W. Nimitz met with President Franklin D. Roosevelt in July 1944, MacArthur’s view was challenged by Nimitz on the grounds that the island of Formosa (Taiwan) was closer to Japan. Never at a loss for words, MacArthur countered that the inhumane Japanese treatment of American and Filipino prisoners subsequent to their takeover — the infamous Bataan Death March — compelled the United States to invade for moral reasons. And, he warned, turning backs on people of color in the Philippines would most assuredly cost FDR his re-election in November 1944.
The eventual Philippines decision was complicated by the fact that the location contained 10 major islands and 7,000 smaller ones. The choice of Leyte was based on its better landing beaches and suitable size (90 miles long, 30 miles wide) for building airfields. Leyte, too, was held by few Japanese troops. Out of 350,000 dispersed throughout the Philippines, only 16,000 populated Leyte, all from the 16th Division that had conducted the Bataan Death March. Not one soldier in that division would survive the American assault, forcing the Japanese to send in numerous replacement forces.
“Leyte,” argued MacArthur, “was the anvil against which I hoped to hammer the Japanese into submission in the central Philippines — the springboard from which I could proceed to the conquest of Luzon, for the final assault on Japan itself.” No scene has been more immortalized than MacArthur wading ashore at Leyte on Oct. 20, along with 137,000 American troops. Via radio and with a fanfare of reporters, MacArthur trumpeted to the Philippine people: “I have returned. By the grace of Almighty God our forces stand again on Philippine soil — soil consecrated in the blood of our two peoples. We have come, dedicated and committed, to the task of destroying every vestige of enemy control over your daily lives, and of restoring, upon a foundation of indestructible strength, the liberties of your people.”
Thanks to the large naval forces, the Leyte landing went smoothly, but the real battle began on the high seas on Oct. 23, punctuated by four separate massive encounters lasting for four days. By that time the Japanese had lost 30 ships and 10,000 men, the United States, six ships and 2,800 men. Then, too, there was the first organized use of kamikaze fighters by Japanese leaders in the erroneous and naive belief that such action would induce Americans to negotiate an end to the war.
Still, landing troops in Leyte and taking control of the entire island were two different issues, and not until year’s end did organized resistance end, with MacArthur’s troops off to Luzon and other islands. But the war’s conclusion was elusive, with major and costly battles on Iwo Jima and then Okinawa. Not until almost a year later, after two atomic bombs had been dropped on their homeland, did the Japanese formally surrender — and to Gen. MacArthur.
• Thomas V. DiBacco is professor emeritus at American University.
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