OPINION:
It is ironic that Thursday marks the anniversary of the signing of the Kellogg-Briand treaty in Paris in 1928 designed to renunciate war as an instrument of national policy
Similarly, Congress is soon to vote on President Obama’s deal with Iran that, in the White House’s reckoning, is the only alternative to war with the rogue nation. The Kellogg-Briand agreement, named after American Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg and French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand, like Mr. Obama’s Iran diplomatic concoction, represented naivete to the utmost degree because the means to prevent military action were conspicuous by their absence or weakness.
The treaty, also called the Pact of Paris, was the brainchild of Briand who in 1927 urged a bilateral agreement with the United States to outlaw war, fearful that Germany might once more threaten European nations without such a denunciation by the leading force of the world. But then President Calvin Coolidge wanted nothing to do with bilateralism, and Secretary of State Kellogg made the idea palatable by urging all nations to agree to the idea. Although the United States, France and Germany were the first to sign, some 64 signatories emerged by July 1929.
Unlike Mr. Obama’s massive deal with Iran, with some side deals still not known or vetted, the Kellogg-Briand pact’s provisions could be put on a single page, no matter the needlessly flowery language:
“Hopeful that, encouraged by their example, all other nations of the world will join in this humane endeavor and by adhering to the present Treaty as soon as it comes to force bring their peoples within the scope of its beneficent provisions, thus uniting the civilized nations of the world in a common renunciation of war as an instrument of their national policy.”
The main thrust was that peaceful means should be used to settle disputes between nations. But there were no provisions for the signatory nations to outlaw war if they were attacked or were called to defend others in a similar situation. Little wonder that when the United States Senate approved the treaty with only one dissenting vote, it added both reservations to its consent.
But both Kellogg and his contemporary counterpart, Secretary of State John Kerry, should have known better about hollow treaties that illustrated that the two men were simply sycophants to their presidents rather than purveyors of their own independent thinking. Both men were attorneys, both had served in the U.S. Senate, with Mr. Kerry heading the prestigious Foreign Relations Committee during an era in which Sept. 11 terrorism against the nation emerged. And although Kellogg was one of the few Republicans who supported joining the League of Nations after World War I, he became as head of the State Department a master of treaty-making, too, generating under his watch a record 80 that were conspicuous for their sense and national self-interest.
Not only was Kellogg a hard-nosed attorney, chosen by the feds early on his career to prosecute antitrust cases, but he also held the coveted post of president of the American Bar Association.
What Kellogg hoped for in the treaty was unrealistic: War, he argued, was “a crime against the law of nations so that any nations which violate it should be condemned by the public opinion of the world.”
But when the world started to deteriorate as the treaty was being signed by numerous nations, public opinion was non-existent. The Nazi Party in Germany, for example, grew from a few thousand members to 27,000 in 1925 and 108,000 in 1929. When Japan, a signatory to the treaty, invaded Manchuria in 1931, nothing was done. The same in 1935 when Italy invaded Ethiopia and when Germany occupied Austria in 1938.
And the same with the current Iran deal: Even before Congress has acted, Iranian Gen. Qasem Soleiman, sanctioned by both the United Nations and the United States for his role in supporting terrorism and barred him from leaving Iran, ventured to Russia in late July to meet with President Vladimir Putin and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu. But no outcries rose against the obvious violation.
Naive hope was still the reaction of Kellogg when on Dec. 10, 1929, he made a speech in Oslo, Norway: “I regret very much to hear so many people, many of my own countrymen,” he said, “predicting war, stating that Europe is preparing and arming for such a conflict. I rather share the opinion of those of broader vision, who see in the signs of the times hope of humanity for peace.”
That speech, incidentally, was made as Kellogg received the Nobel Peace Prize.
• Thomas V. DiBacco is professor emeritus at American University.
Please read our comment policy before commenting.