THE AL QAEDA FACTOR: PLOTS AGAINST THE WEST
By Mitchell D. Silber
University of Pennsylvania Press, $39.95, 368 pages
In “The Al Qaeda Factor,” Mitchell D. Silber investigates the extent to which al Qaeda’s “core” in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region has been involved in organizing terrorist plots against the West since the World Trade Center bombing in 1993. Such an investigation, Mr. Silber rightly contends, is the first step needed to counter the planning and execution of such attacks. As director of intelligence analysis for the New York Police Department, which investigates terrorist plots against his city, Mr. Silber is ideally suited for this task.
Mr. Silber notes that the killing of Osama bin Laden in May 2011 damaged and weakened an organization that had “relied on its top leader for strategy, operational direction, and command and control of its actions abroad.” But, he forcefully argues, the question remains whether an organization that already had decentralized its operations following its withdrawal from Afghanistan in the aftermath of Sept. 11 would “continue to pose a threat through its remnants, affiliates, and allies, as well as those whom its message can inspire to action.”
Before reaching a conclusion, he asks: Did al Qaeda actually send “emissaries” to these radicalized communities in the West to recruit new adherents to carry out its attacks, or did its “heroic narrative”-based ideology inspire such individuals from afar? How did those in the West who decided to carry out such attacks link up with al Qaeda in Pakistan? What type of training did they receive at al Qaeda’s training camps? Did al Qaeda directly organize, fund and launch these attacks, or did it merely “endorse” them? Finally, did al Qaeda decide who among the plotters would execute the operations?
He then presents 16 cases in which al Qaeda-related terrorism plots were executed, beginning with the first bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, continuing with the Sept. 11 attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the attacks against the transportation systems in Madrid in March 2004 and London in July 2005, and Najibullah Zazi’s thwarted attack against New York City’s subway system in September 2009.
Based on the findings from his 16 cases, Mr. Silber identifies three possible categories to describe the al Qaeda core’s possible role in these plots against the West. It is his contention that the core exercised complete “command and control” over some, “suggested or endorsed” others by Western operatives who traveled to Pakistan or “inspired” other plots remotely - for example, through the group’s extremist websites.
Notable among his findings is the role of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed in the Sept. 11 attacks. Khalid Shaikh Mohammad was al Qaeda’s chief operational planner at the time. He and bin Laden exercised direct command and control of the simultaneous attacks.
However, as Mr. Silber points out, it was in the aftermath of the Sept. 11 attacks that al Qaeda’s core lost much of its capability. It was forced to disperse from its previous safe haven in Afghanistan to Pakistan’s tribal areas, where it found sanctuary with the help of the Taliban and was protected over time by elements in the Pakistani government, such as the ISI, its intelligence and security service.
Mr. Silber notes that most of the individuals in his case studies linked to al Qaeda’s core through a “bottom-up” process, with active recruiters present in only one case, that of the Lackawanna 6, who were active in 2000 in the area near Buffalo, N.Y.
So how potent is al Qaeda now? And what are the implications for its homegrown Western terrorists? I agree with Mr. Silber that since Sept. 11, al Qaeda has lost much of its direct command and control over the Western operatives who carried out - or attempted to carry out - terrorist attacks against their home countries in Western Europe, the United States and Canada. However, I would add that this also was a result of effective counterterrorism measures that were instituted after Sept. 11. One consequence is that groups such as al Qaeda have shifted much of their radicalization activities in the West to the Internet, where their propaganda continues to serve as a recruitment resource for future terrorists.
Should we be concerned? Yes. However, with books like Mr. Silber’s “The Al Qaeda Factor,” so should our enemies.
•Joshua Sinai is an associate professor for research, specializing in counterterrorism studies, at a Virginia Tech center in Arlington.
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