EDITORIAL: Winning in Afghanistan

OPINION:

In June 2005, before becoming speaker of the House, Rep. Nancy Pelosi said, “The war in Afghanistan is over,” making the case that Guantanamo detainees should therefore be released. It was a political ploy unconnected to the reality of Afghanistan. Five years later, U.S. combat fatalities in Afghanistan are five times higher.

Scores of diplomats will converge in Kabul today for an international aid conference. One legitimate question potential donors might ask is, what does victory look like in Afghanistan? Political leaders have been loath to be too precise about what constitutes winning in the Afghan war. They never use the word “victory” - perhaps thinking if they don’t establish a firm definition of what constitutes a win, they will be able to sidestep blame if they lose.

Troop levels are a popular measure of commitment, particularly because they are quantifiable, but this can lead to perception problems. Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. recently said, “In July of 2011, you’re going to see a whole lot of people moving out. Bet on it.” That would have been a losing bet. On Sunday, he backtracked on the pullout claim, saying, “It could be as few as a couple thousand troops. It could be more. But there will be a transition.” He left the impression that the war is going worse than expected, but this numbers game is a self-inflicted wound. Troop levels should not be determined by abstract timelines or the political calendar but by the security situation in the country. Had the president not set an arbitrary date to begin the drawdown of forces, this issue never would have arisen.

The war in Iraq provides a more tangible model for measuring progress. The critical aspect of the “surge” strategy was not the number of additional troops sent to the country but the manner in which they were used, and establishing conditions in Iraqi provinces for handing off responsibility for security to local forces. Each transition was another milestone toward establishing a secure Iraq. It was done systematically, and the process conveyed an intuitive sense that the coalition was making progress. This translated into greater U.S. public support for the effort and an outcome that looks very much like victory.

Afghanistan has 34 provinces comprising 397 districts. Some are very secure, others decidedly not. In that respect, Afghanistan is in a similar situation to Iraq’s in 2007. A province-by-province approach to Afghanistan - starting with the most secure areas and handing off responsibility for the defense of the area to the Afghan government - could build the same kind of momentum it did in Iraq. It also could help rebuild support with the American public for the war effort similar to the surge in Iraq. Such a strategy will make progress in the war more comprehensible to the American people and build a more solid political foundation in the country. This is critical because, as in the case of Vietnam, the enemy cannot defeat U.S. forces on the battlefield but may be able to create domestic political conditions that will make it difficult if not impossible to sustain the war effort.

Handing over all the security responsibilities to the Afghan government is a reasonable measure of success in the war, so this approach lays out a road map to victory. It’s important that the United States comes out of its longest war with a check in the win column.