OPINION:
THE GENERALS: PATTON, MACARTHUR, MARSHALL, AND THE WINNING OF WORLD WAR II
By Winston Groom
National Geographic, $30, 496 pages
As the World War II generation slips away it is important to sharpen the historical consciousness of that ordeal and of the principal actors in it. Winston Groom has made this a mission with “The Aviators,” “The Generals” and, soon to come, “The Admirals.” His approach is selective, given the huge possible cast of players. He has chosen key commanders with larger-than-life personalities and differing roles, allowing excellent insight and minimizing duplication. Marshall stood alone in his comprehensive responsibility and understanding; Patton was the personification of the daring, headlong tank general and gave momentum and dash to the offensive against the Germans; MacArthur was a legend from World War I when he had commanded the Rainbow Division. In World War II he was a gifted fighter and planner driven by a hatred of the Japanese for their abuses of allied POWs. He had an impressive mystique dating from his very earliest years in the Army.
Marshall had two gifts to an advanced degree. He had a self-discipline that was all but superhuman, a seeming immunity from depression and impatience that enabled him to carry his huge responsibility for the war without emotional distress, in this respect resembling “the Iron Duke” of Wellington. He had a unique ability to see, and to manage, solutions to problems of great complexity, making him the intellectual leader of his peers. It is often said that he wanted to command the European Theater of Operations, but accepted, with disappointment, Roosevelt’s need for his direction in Washington. My own belief is that by June 1944 it must have been obvious to Marshall that his direction had to be based in Washington and that there was no one to take his place.
Marshall had severe doubts about the competence of the British generals, based on their poor performance against the Germans in both world wars. He had to balance the urgency of establishing a front in Western Europe with the time required to bring troop training and equipment procurement to the necessary levels. Even then, the consensus was that U.S. and allied troops were deficient in training when they were sent into combat.
The text dealing with Patton is the most fun to read. Patton’s outsized ego, aggressive spirit and his frequent outrageous public relations blunders inspire sympathy for him and entertainment. Gen. Bradley tried to keep him out of trouble, but was often too little and too late.
Patton was indispensable, yet troublesome. His 100-mile march to blunt the German offensive at the Battle of the Bulge was one for the history books, suggestive of Gen. Sherman’s sensational march to the sea across the heartland of the Confederacy. Yet his gratuitous mouthings-off nearly destroyed his career. He believed in reincarnation, wrote about it, and was convinced he had fought at Carthage against Scipio Africanus. His dramatic posturings, even with twin ivory-handled revolvers, could have made him a figure of fun, but instead polished the legendary image. His energetic performance in the famous Louisiana maneuvers in 1940 gave him a place at the table among senior combat commanders. His presence in the European theater of operations inspired fear among the German commanders. War can do that — make a legend of a commander who might be a peacetime failure. Sherman and Patton have much in common in that respect.
The third in this triumvirate, Douglas MacArthur, occupies a different place. The most senior of the three, MacArthur had earned a legendary place prior to World War II as a student of unparalleled brilliance at West Point and as commander of the famous Rainbow Division in World War I. He was recommended for but did not receive the Congressional Medal of Honor in the earlier war, superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point between the wars, chief of staff of the Army in the 1930s, and retired from the Army to become Field Marshal of the Philippine Defense Force.
His career had not been without controversy: falling out with FDR over Army appropriations, and employing very rough means to disperse the bonus marchers in Washington during the Hoover administration. His reputation was a mixture of theatrical flair, vanity and “my way or the highway.” Nevertheless, when the Japanese struck the Philippines, destroying MacArthur’s B-17s on the ground, he became a popular hero in the headlines, and his seniority made him an obvious and early candidate for senior command, But the Pacific theater was mostly water and, inevitably, the Navy commanders were going to be the chief deciders. The Southwest Pacific theater was organized, with MacArthur as theater commander with his own Army, Navy and Army Air Force commanders, all three proving to be highly competent.
Winston Groom has done a fine job, mixing wartime strategy and tactics with strong, highly individual personalities and aggressive military brass.
• David C. Acheson is past president of the Atlantic Council of the United States, and U.S. attorney for the District of Columbia, 1961-1965. He served in the Pacific Fleet during World War II on destroyer escorts.
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